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The Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) was 
established for the purpose of restoring legal and judicial security in the region to attract 
more investment. The OHADA Treaty included certain areas of business law within its 
ambit but omitted investment law. There are several laws on investment in the region at 
the national, regional and sub-regional level that regulate the treatment of foreign 
investments such as CEMAC and UEMOA investment charters. Moreover OHADA 
states sign BITs to protect foreign investments. The relationship between the different 
sub regional laws on investment and OHADA is not yet clear but case law suggests that 
CEMAC and UEMOA courts recognise the supremacy of OHADA law and their lack of 
competence to hear matters regulated under OHADA. The standards of protection 
granted by OHADA states in BITs are very high thus taxing on them. This thesis 
suggests that OHADA states should either qualify these standards of protection or 
replace them with more specific provisions. The OHADA system of arbitration cannot 
effectively settle investment disputes arising out of a BIT leaving international 
arbitration systems such as ICSID as the best alternative to resolve investment disputes 
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CHAPTER ONE: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SECURITY IN OHADA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Governments traditionally raise funds in several ways including taxes, fees, penalties, 
fines, loans and aid. The last two methods have been used primarily by developing 
countries. It has been argued that one of the reasons developing countries1 are in 
constant need of foreign capital is because they do not have sufficient funds to finance 
their national projects.2 The collapse of commercial banks’ lending facility and the debt 
crisis in the 1980s led to the decline of aid from developed countries and that of lending 
from commercial banks and to an increase in importance of private international 
financial flows or foreign investment.3  Chakrabarti stated: 
‘…During most of the 1980s, the majority of the developing economies were effectively 
shut out of the international capital markets following the borrowing binge of the 1970s and the 
breakdown of normal financial relations in 1982- 1983 (the so called debt-overhang). This 
financial constraint, particularly severe for the heavily indebted countries, quickly translated 
into a sharp decline in investment and growth rate in these economies. This resulted in the 
growing importance of FDI as a relatively reliable source of capital flows for the LDCs’4 
Furthermore many donor countries were experiencing ‘aid fatigue’5 since 
development funds granted to developing countries were not yielding the desired results. 
These countries were also dealing with their own challenges related to recession and 
unemployment among other things.6 Some countries voiced the opinion that massive 
                                                          
1 Developing countries in this context is one in which the majority of the population lives on far less 
money- with far fewer basic public services- than the population in highly industrialised countries. The 
United Nations and the World Bank use different terms to refer to developing countries. The United 
Nations also refer to them as ‘least developed countries’ or ‘landlocked developing countries’. The World 
Bank designates them according to their gross national income per capita. It therefore categorises them as 
low income, lower middle income, upper middle income and high income.  
2 E Demirhan & M Masca ‘Determinants of foreign direct investment flows to developing countries: A 
cross-sectional analysis’ (2008) 4 Prague Economic Papers 356. 
3 Ibid; R Biswas ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments’ (2002) 6 Review of Development 
Economics 492 at 492.  
4A Chakrabarti ‘The Determinant of Foreign Investment: Sensitivity analyses of Cross- Country 
Regressions’ (2001) 54 KYKLOS 89; Demirhan & Masca op cit (n2) 356 to 357. 
5 PL Tsai ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct investment and its impact on economic growth’ (1994) 19 
Journal of Economic Development 137. 
6 M. Sornarajah The international law on foreign investment 2ed (2004) 2. 
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increase in aid was neither practical nor the best means of ensuring sustained economic 
growth in the South7 and that private capital flow might be the solution instead.8  
The Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa9 (OHADA) 
endeavoured to increase the rate of investment within the region by modernising and 
harmonising the business laws of its member states.10 The harmonised laws are meant to 
address the problem of legal and judicial insecurity which was identified as the source of 
OHADA countries’ weak share in foreign direct investment (FDI).11 However some 
scholars pointed out that while a stable legal framework is a factor that investors will 
consider when deciding to invest in a particular country, it is not the only one. 
Furthermore it might not be the most compelling factor. The question therefore is 
whether or not legal and judicial security in OHADA will be a crucial factor for foreign 
investors wishing to invest in the region. 
1.1. Definition of foreign direct investment  
Foreign capital flow manifests itself in four forms namely commercial loans, official 
flows or aid, foreign portfolio investment and foreign direct investment.12Commercial 
loans are credits given to governments or foreign businesses by an international financial 
institution. Official flows refer to aid or development assistance that developed countries 
extend to developing countries.13 Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) is a passive 
investment in securities and involves transactions in securities and shares that are highly 
liquid.14 It deals with assets that can be bought and sold very quickly and the investor is 
not involved in the management of the company. FPI generates high and quick returns 
                                                          
7 The term ‘South’ originates from the socio economic and political gap between developed and 
developing countries. It refers to the less developed region made up of Africa, Latin America and the 
Middle East. 
8 Sornarajah op cit (n6)138. 
9 Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa was established by the Treaty of Port 
Louis signed in 1993. It is usually known by its French acronym, OHADA. 
10
 Preamble to the OHADA treaty; M Tumnde, IB Mohammed, JAP Matipé et al Unified Business Laws 
for Africa: Common Law Perspective on OHADA 2ed (2012) 31. 
11 JF Nguepjo  Le role des juridictions supranationales de la CEMAC et de l’OHADA dans l’intégration 
des droits communautaires par les Etats membres PhD (Université Panthéon- Assas) (2011) 55 to 56. 
12 Globalisation 101 ‘Investment and Globalisation, available at 
http://www.globalization101.org/uploads/File/Investment/invall.pdf, accessed on 5 September 2014. 
13 www.Investopedia.com/terms/p/portfolio investment.asp , accessed on 5 September 2014. 
14 En.wikipedia.org/wiki/foreign_portfolio_investment, accessed on 5 September 2014. 
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but is also highly volatile.15 Foreign direct investment or FDI refers to a long term 
interest that an investor acquires in an enterprise in a country other than his home 
country.16 Sornarajah understood it as a transfer of tangible and intangible assets from 
one country to another for the purpose of generating wealth under the total or partial 
control of the owner of the assets.17The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) describes FDI as ‘a cross-border investment by a resident entity 
in one economy with the objective of obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise 
resident in another economy.  The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of 
influence by the direct investor on the management of the enterprise….’18 
1.2. Advantages of foreign direct investment 
Countries seek foreign investments because the domestic capital is often insufficient for 
purposes of economic development.19 In an ideal economic environment FDI brings in 
capital, infrastructure, technology and skills transfer as the foreign investor comes with 
its expertise and better technology.20 Feldstein, Razin and Sadka contend that FDI 
allows the transfer of technology particularly in the form of new variety of capital input 
that cannot be achieved through financial investment or trade in goods and services.21  
FDI also creates employment hence expanding the country’s tax base as the 
number of individuals to be taxed increases.22 However it has been argued, in the case of 
Southern Africa, that FDI does not necessarily come with significant employment 
                                                          
15 Available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/foreign-portfolio-investment-fpi.asp, accessed on 16 
October 2014.  
16 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fdi.asp; OECD Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and 
Definitions, available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/2487495.pdf, accessed 
on 16 October 2014. 
17 Sornarajah op cit (n6) 7. 
18 OECD glossary of foreign direct Investment terms and definitions, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/2487495.pdf, accessed on 16 October 2014. 
19 R Tiwari ‘FDI, its advantages and disadvantages’ 25 September 2013 available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/RupalTiwari1/fdi-26538521, accessed on 22 July 2014. 
20
 E Borenztein, JD Gregorio & JW Lee ‘How does foreign direct investment affect economic growth’ 
(1998) 45 Journal of International Economics 115 at 116 to117. 
21 M Feldstein ‘Aspects of Global Economic Integration: Outlook for the Future’ (2000) NBER Working 
Paper No. 7899;  L Prakash & A Razin ‘How Beneficial is Foreign Direct Investment to Developing 
Countries’ (2001) 38 Finance and Development, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/loungani.htm,  accessed on 22 July 2014. 
22
 E Asiedu ‘On the Determinant of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa 
different?’ (2001) 30 World Development 107. 
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creation and that in fact it leads to job losses when public companies are privatised.23 It 
was further argued that the quality of employments created by FDI is very low and is 
characterised by poor working conditions, very low wages and little job security.24  
The labour will acquire new skills from the technology introduced by the foreign 
investor. This knowledge is then transferred to local personnel as they move to other 
firms.25 FDI therefore increases the productivity and promotes competition in the 
domestic market.26 In addition Profits generated by FDI lead to an increase of corporate 
tax revenue.27  However this is diluted as host countries usually grant tax holidays as an 
incentive to attract foreign investment.28 
Moreover FDI is preferred to portfolio investment because, though FPI yields 
quicker results in terms of profits, it is much more volatile. Changes in a country’s 
investment conditions can lead to dramatic swing of portfolio investment with the 
investor withdrawing his investment as a consequence.  FPI can bring about rapid 
development helping emerging economies more quickly to take advantage of economic 
opportunities.29 However when a country’s economic situation takes a downfall so does 
FPI as investors pull out. Such sudden withdrawal can produce widespread financial 
crises.30 
FDI on the other hand is more stable. Since the investor possesses ownership of 
the asset it is more difficult for it to pull out or sell out as quickly. The investor sinks 
significant funds into the asset and will be more committed to managing his investment 
                                                          
23 N Mwilima ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Africa’ Social observatory pilot project- final draft report, 
Labour Resource and Research Institute, September 2003, available at 
http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000883/P994-African_Social_Observatory_PilotProject_FDI.pdf, 
accessed on 16 February 2015. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Sornarajah op cit (n6) 51; FH Liang ‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Improve the Productivity of 
Domestic Firms? Technology Spillovers, Industry Linkages, and Firm Capabilities’ (2008) Haas School of 
Business University of California, Berkeley 2. 
26
 K Kalirajan & A Mottaleb ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in developing countries: A 
comparative analysis’ (2010) 4 The Journal of Applied Economics 370. 
27 L Prakash & A Razin ‘How Beneficial is Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries’ (2001) 38 
Finance and Development, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/loungani.htm,  
accessed on 22 July 2014. 
28  Sornarajah op cit (n6) 115. 
29  Available at http://www.diffen.com/difference/FDI_vs_FPI, accessed on 20 February 2015. 
30 Available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/foreign-portfolio-investment-fpi.asp, accessed on 14 
November 2014.  
13 
 
to generate profits. Unlike FPI, FDI returns are not immediate as investors will only 
benefit from their investment after years. FDI is nevertheless viewed as the best vehicle 
of economic growth to all countries but more specifically to developing. Tsai argued 
that: 
‘According to modernisation hypothesis, FDI promotes economic growth by providing external 
capital and through growth spreads its benefits throughout the economy… FDI usually brings 
with it advanced technology and better management and organisation. FDI is in fact the other 
‘engine’ of growth in LDCs…In the short run; any increase in FDI enables higher investment 
and consumption and thus creates directly and immediately economic growth…’31 
The dependency theory32 however finds FDI harmful to the economy of 
developing countries.33 The theory developed as a result of the unequal economic 
relations between developing and developed countries.  It argued that developing 
countries’ underdevelopment is caused by their role as suppliers of raw materials and 
buyers of manufactured goods from developed countries at a higher price. 
 Indeed FDI is mostly undertaken by multinational corporations which have their 
mother companies in developed countries and operate through subsidiaries in developing 
countries.34 The host state will devise laws and policies that will be attractive to the 
multinational corporations (MNCs) thus in the interest of the mother company.35 As a 
consequence states in the Third World become peripheral economies whose role is to 
advance the economy of center.36 The dependency theory contends that developing 
economies will only reach economic development if they break the bond that ties them 
to the central economy; that is FDI.37 
It has also been suggested that developing countries exclude foreigners from certain 
industries since their investments may stifle the emergence of an entrepreneurial class 
                                                          
31 Tsai op cit (n5) 137. 
32 The dependency theory was developed in the 1950s in Latin America. It observed on the unequal 
economic growth of advanced industrialised countries compared to that of poorer countries. It contended 
that the relationship of dependency between these categories of States was the cause of underdevelopment 
of poor countries. Therefore poor countries will only achieve significant economic growth if they break 
such a relationship and device policies promoting self-sufficiency.  
33 Sornarajah op cit (n6) 57. 
34 Ibid. 
35





within the state.38 De Backer and Sleuwagen argued that it may be so but only in the 
short term and that in fact domestic companies do benefit from FDI in the long term 
through ‘spill over’ effect.39 
Developing countries are more susceptible to create conditions that will attract 
foreign investment. It was acknowledged that FDI is crucial for Africa as it brings with 
it much needed capital, employment, managerial skills and technology, and accelerates 
growth and development.40  Quéré, Coupet and Mayer also observed: 
‘FDI is considered one of the most stable components of capital flows to developing countries 
and can also be a vehicle for technological progress through the use and dissemination of 
improved production technique…’41 
Similarly it was observed that developing countries are aware of the benefits of FDI as 
most of them compete with each other to attract FDI by liberalising their policy regimes 
and offering various incentive packages, such as tax rebates, trade liberalisation 
measures, establishment of special economic zones among others.42 
1.3. Legal and Judicial security 
Investment is inherently risky and countries that wish to attract foreign investors 
within their territories must provide certain legal and economic guarantees.  Hence it 
was observed that: 
‘Investing is already a risk in itself even if calculated. If the risk is increased by a fluctuating 
unstable and elusive legal system, there is not a lot of hope of attracting investors’43 
Hausman and Fernandez suggested that countries should concentrate on improving the 
environment for investment and the functioning of the market. They pointed out that 
they [countries] will likely be rewarded with an increasingly efficient overall investment 
                                                          
38  Sornarajah op cit (n6) 118; 326 – 327; SH Danakol, S Estrin, P Reynolds et al ‘Foreign Direct 
Investment and Domestic entrepreneurship: Blessing or Curse’, the Institute for the Study of Labour, 
December 2013, available at http://www.eea-esem.com/files/papers/eea-
esem/2013/2898/FDI_Entrepreneurship_DANAKOL_ESTRIN_REYNOLDS_WEITZEL.pdf,  accessed on 7 
August 2014. 
39 K De Backer & L Sleuwaegen ‘Does foreign investment crowd out domestic entrepreneurship?’(2003) 
22 Review of Industrial Organization 67 at 75. 
40  Asiedu op cit (n22)107. 
41 A  Benassy-Quéré, M Coupet & T Mayer ‘Institutional determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
(2007) The World Economy 764. 
42 Kalirajan & Mottaleb op cit (n26) 370.  
43 P Aregba ‘L’OHADA: Histoire, objectifs, structures’ in Philippe Fouchard (director) L’OHADA et les 
perspectives de l’ arbitrage en Afrique’ (2000) 9. 
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as well as more capital inflows.44 In other words countries that seek investment must 
create an environment that will motivate investors to bring in capital into their markets. 
As mentioned previously developing countries will tend to benefit the most from 
foreign investments and the majority of African countries figure in that category.45 In an 
effort to create an environment conducive to investment a group of African countries 
mostly from the Franc Zone46 undertook to harmonise their business laws and 
established the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business laws in Africa or 
OHADA47. Indeed OHADA member states declared, in the preamble to the OHADA 
Treaty that: 
‘…conscious of the fact that this law [OHADA Treaty and its Uniform Acts] be applied with 
diligence in such conditions so as to guarantee legal stability of economic activities and to 
favour expansion of the latter and to encourage investment’48 
Some authors were of the opinion that investors will only be prone to invest in countries 
with a sound legal and judicial system: 
‘…Continued investment and development cannot be achieved without on the one hand 
a secure legal and commercial environment that will protect private property and on the other 
hand a strong and independent judicial system that can ensure the proper application of the law 
and the efficient settlement of disputes’.49 
 Pierre Meyer termed it ‘sécurité juridique et judiciaire’ or legal and judicial 
security.50 Some scholars agreed that OHADA was set up to improve legal security and 
predictability in order to foster international investment and trade and to promote socio 
                                                          
44 R Hausmann & E Fernandez-Arias ‘Foreign Direct Investment: Good Cholesterol?’ Inter-American 
Development Bank Working Paper No. 417, 26 March 2000, available at 
http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubWP-417.pdf, accessed on 23 January 2015. 
45 Available at http://data.worldbank.org/region/LDC, accessed on 21 February 2015. 
46 The Franc Zone comprises 14 countries from western and central Africa and the Comoros Islands in the 
Indian Ocean. Eight of them make up the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA): Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Six others make up the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC): Cameroun, Central African Republic, Tchad, 
Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Their currency is linked to the French ‘Franc’ at a fixed rate. 
Available at  http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php?title=Franc_Zone, accessed on 24 January 2015. 
47 OHADA’s official name is “ Organisation pour l’Harmonization en Afrique du Droit des Affaires”. 
48 Preamble to the Treaty on the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa or 
OHADA Treaty.  
49 B Martor, N Pilkington, DS Seller & S Thouvenot Business law in Africa: OHADA and the 
harmonization process 2ed (2002). 
50 P Meyer ‘La Securité Juridique et Judiciaire dans l’espace OHADA ’Revue Penant No 855, available at 




economic growth in Africa.51 Similarly Leboulanger and Douajini were of the opinion 
that:  
‘The purpose of the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business law in Africa (OHADA 
Treaty) is to promote investment for the development of the contracting states, by developing a 
business law that is simple, modern and adaptable, in order to secure such investments within 
OHADA space, both at a legal and a judicial level’52 
Researchers advised countries to develop credible enforcement mechanisms 
instead of trying to get more FDI if they wish to expand their market access to 
international capital markets.53 Judicial security can be understood as the existence of a 
strong and independent judicial system that will ensure the proper application of the 
norms and the effective resolution of disputes.  Legal security on the other hand refers to 
laws and advocates for clear modern and ascertainable laws. 
OHADA resorted to harmonisation of the member state’s business laws to 
achieve legal and judicial security and incidentally attract investment within the 
OHADA space. The term harmony in music suggests a state of consonance and accord.54 
It depicts ‘the aesthetical coexistence of different notes which are in accordance with 
one another without necessarily being the same’.55 Harmonisation, unlike unification, 
preserves the diversity or individuality of the objects harmonised- in this case laws from 
several jurisdiction- while trying to approximate them.56 Therefore national law may still 
be applicable. Unification on the other hand is radical as its purpose is to achieve 
sameness which implies that the existing laws of the different member states are 
replaced by the uniform law. 
                                                          
51 Tumnde, Mohammed, Matipé et al op cit (n10).  
52 P Leboulanger & GK Douajini ‘Arbitration under the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the 
OHADA contracting states’ in Lise Bosman (ed)  Arbitration in Africa: A Practitioner’s guide  (2013) 
317. 
53 R Albuquerque ‘The Composition of International Capital Flows: Risk Sharing through Foreign Direct 
Investment’ (2003) 61 Journal of International Economics 353 at 380. 
54 M Boodman ‘The myth of harmonization of laws, (1991) 39 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 700. 
55 M Andenas & CB Andersen (Eds) The theory and Practice of Harmonization (2011) 576. 
56 C Twigg-Flesner & GV Puig (Ed) ‘Some thoughts on the harmonization of commercial law and the 
impact on cross border transactions’ 29 July 2011, available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957618, 
accessed on 8 August 2014; S Procelli & Y Zhai ‘The challenge for the Harmonization of Law’ (2010) 17 
Transit. Stud. Rev. 430. 
17 
 
Harmonisation of laws arises in the context of private extra jurisdictional 
transactions.57  Consequently the process of harmonisation is aimed at reducing the 
divergence between the laws of several jurisdictions or reducing the problems created by 
such diversity.58 Flesner is of the opinion that the very existence of harmonisation is 
intrinsically linked to resolving a problem.59 Similarly Boodman argued that ‘outside the 
context of a legal problem and without prior justification, harmonisation of law is 
unintelligible as an objective or basis for law reform despite its ostensible application to 
inter-jurisdictional transactions’.60 Therefore it must be ascertained that legal diversity is 
a problem and that legal harmonisation is best suited to solve the problem.61 It was 
pointed out that harmonisation implemented to solve an identified problem has better 
chances of success.62 
OHADA identified legal diversity and out-dated laws as an impediment to 
investment because they increase transaction costs and cause uncertainty in the area as to 
the outcome of a dispute or the protection of the investment.63  Therefore the 
organisation purported to solve these issues by harmonising business laws of the 
different member states hence providing modern laws and an environment conducive to 
investment. 
Stephan however found harmonisation to be a futile exercise and argued that 
better results would be obtained if the experiment of introducing new laws is limited at 
the national.64 For instance he finds the implementation of a new law in a single country 
to be much easier than establishing an international consensus. This may be true when 
one considers the amount of time negotiations take at the international level let alone 
arrive at a consensus.65 However the same danger still exists at the national level. The 
                                                          
57 Boodman op cit (n54) 702. 
58 Twigg-Flesner &  Puig op cit (n56) 106. 
59 Ibid. 
60  Boodman op cit (n54) 706. 
61 JA Estrella Fria ‘Future direction of legal harmonization and law reform: Stormy sea or prosperous 
voyage’ (2009) Unif. Law. Rev, Oxford Journals 5 available at http://ulr.oxfordjournals.org,  
62 Twigg-Flesner & Puig op cit (n56) 125. 
63
 JF Nguepjo  Le role des juridictions supranationales de la CEMAC et de l’OHADA dans l’intégration 
des droits communautaires par les Etats membres PhD (Université Panthéon- Assas) (2011) 55 to 56 
64 PB Stephan ‘Futility of unification and Harmonization of international commercial law’ (1999) Working 
paper No99-10 Legal Studies Working Papers Series 36. 
65 The Doha Round of Negotiations started in 2001 and has not yet been completed up to date.  
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process of domestication by dualist countries is as time consuming and the 
implementation would be asymmetric. There would therefore be a cacophony in the 
implementation process. However this problem may not arise when the countries 
involved are monist countries like OHADA member states.  
He further contended that confining the experiment to one country would limit 
the spill over effect within that jurisdiction alone and would thus be easier to remedy 
should it become a failure. Amendments to international treaties and conventions are 
difficult to implement since countries are very slow at ratifying and incorporating them 
in their legislations. It may be equally difficult to reach a consensus regarding those 
amendments. However OHADA addressed the issue by providing for direct applicability 
of Uniform Acts.66 These Uniform Acts include a Uniform Act on arbitration. 
Lastly he observed that certain groups may influence the law making process at 
the inter jurisdictional level making sure that the rules that are unfavourable to them are 
discarded and replaced by rules that protect their interest at the expense of other groups. 
This phenomenon occurs in the multilateral arena through power struggles between the 
different countries. Such a struggle would be less pronounced when countries have the 
same level of development as OHADA member states. 
1.4. Determinants of foreign direct investment 
Factors that may influence an investor’s decision to invest in a country differ depending 
on that country’s level of economic development or on the investor’s motives hence the 
assertion that determinants of FDI are multidimensional in nature.67  
Some researchers found that the determinants of FDI in developed and 
developing countries are different. Others argued that determinants of FDI differ among 
developing countries68 while others contend that the determinants of FDI in Africa are 
different from those of other developing countries.69 
Determinants of foreign direct investment are primarily economic in nature. 
Indeed the cost of production, the size of the economy and the level of economic 
                                                          
66 Art 10 of the OHADA Treaty. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Kalirajan & Mottaleb op cit (n26) 372. 
69  Asiedu op cit (n22)116. 
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development, openness to trade, cheap and skilled labour, profit, infrastructure, natural 
resources, institutions, business environment and trade are the main factors that the 
investor will consider.70 Institutions and business environment relate to the legal and 
judicial regime, the regulatory framework, government institutions and practices.  
Asiedu, on her part, argues that Africa is different and that while some factors 
may increase FDI in developed and some developing countries, they may not yield the 
same results in Africa especially sub-Saharan Africa.71 For instance high returns on 
investment and better infrastructure have no significant impact on FDI in sub-Saharan 
Africa; openness to trade is beneficial to all countries but less so to sub-Saharan Africa. 
In her 2003 study she therefore found that factors determining the flow of FDI in Africa 
are macroeconomic stability, efficient institution, political stability and a good 
regulatory framework. Later on however she acknowledged that despite the many legal 
and regulatory improvements sub-Saharan African countries remain less attractive to 
FDI flow than other countries.72 
Morisset found that aggressive liberalisation, modern investment codes and 
strong economic growth are important determinants of FDI in Africa.73 
  Legal and regulatory frameworks have a significant impact in sub-Saharan 
Africa but less so in developed than developing countries.74 As far as legal and 
regulatory frameworks are concerned one may argue that their presence or lack thereof 
has not deterred investors from investing in high risk countries such as African 
countries.75 The argument may be valid to a certain extent but it has also been proven 
that Africa’s share to the total global FDI has been insignificant.76  
                                                          
70 JP Walsh & J Yu ‘Determinants of foreign direct investment: A sectoral and institutional approach’ IMF 
Working Paper No 187, July 2010, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10187.pdf, accessed on 2 September 2014; See also note 
37 and note 38.  
71 Asiedu op cit (n22) 108. 
72 E Loots & A Kabundi ‘Foreign Direct Investment to Africa: trends, dynamics and challenges’ (2012) 15 
South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 129 footnote omitted  
73 Loots & Kabundi op cit (n72) 129 footnote omitted. 
74 Kalirajan & Mottaleb op cit (n26) 111 to 116;  P Fouchard L’OHADA et les perspectives de l’ arbitrage 
en Afrique’ (2000) 9. 
75 In its 2002 World Investment Report, the UNCTAD observed that in the period 1996 to 2000 African 
countries received FDI mainly in the primary sector especially natural resources; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development  ‘Transnational corporations and export competitiveness’ World 
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Developed countries are and still remain the preferred destination of foreign 
direct investment.77 In 2007 the world’s total FDI inflow was $1, 833.32 billion of which 
27.3% went to developing countries and the rest to developed countries.78 Africa’s share 
within developing countries declined from 24.1% in the 1970s to 6.2% in the 1990s and 
increased to 10.3% between 2000 and 2008.79  Loots and Kabundi observed that Africa’s 
share to the FDI inflow decreased from 5.2% in the 1970s to 1.9% in the 1990s but later 
increased to 3% over the period 2000 to 2008.80 
Despite Asiedu’s reservations regarding the impact of the legal and regulatory 
improvements undertaken by African countries Africa’s share in the world’s FDI 
seemed to increase even if ever so slightly when African countries initiated the process 
of improving the business environment by getting rid of archaic laws, relics of the 
colonial period. OHADA is an example of such an attempt.81 
1.5. Conclusion 
The view that legal certainty is an important determinant of foreign investment in Africa 
has not yet been completely accepted and has been widely criticised. Some authors 
contend that though African countries have undertaken legal reforms in favour of 
foreign investments no significant increase in the rate of FDI has been registered thus 
implying that legal reforms are ineffective as determinants of foreign investment.82 They 
nevertheless acknowledged that Africa is different.83 Therefore having a stable legal 
framework figures among the many determinants even if it is not the most compelling 
and OHADA chose it as the foundation of its legal reforms. Moreover it is notoriously 
difficult to prove a negative ie in this case whether there would have been less 
investment in the absence of legal reforms. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Investment Report, 2002, available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2002_en.pdf, accessed on 18 February 
2015. 
76
 Kalirajan & Mottaleb op cit (n26) 372. 
77 Kalirajan & Mottaleb op cit (n26) 371. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Loots & Kabundi op cit (n72) 130 to131. 
80 Ibid. 
81 OHADA Treaty was established in 1993 then revised in 2003 primarily to modernise the laws of its 
member states which still used legislations transplanted during the colonial period. 




The legal and judicial security that OHADA is trying to achieve through 
harmonisation may seem to be an appropriate approach for Africa. Indeed until recently 
African countries still, with a few exceptions, used laws that were imported from the 
former colonial masters. Moreover the African judiciary has a long history of abuse, 
corruption and partiality. Judicial and legal security may reassure the investor that its 
rights will be upheld and that it will have access to a reliable judicial or dispute 
resolution system. 
This dissertation is structured in the following way: Chapter one will inquire 
whether or not legal and judicial security is a determinant of foreign direct investment. 
Chapter two will then examine the different investment laws in the OHADA region. It 
will further examine a number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed by some 
OHADA member states to ascertain the type of protection OHADA countries are willing 
to grant to foreign investors. A comparative analysis will be undertaken in chapter three 
to determine whether the investment chapter of the North American Free Trade 
agreement (NAFTA) is a suitable model for OHADA countries in the event investment 
law is harmonised. Chapter four will look at the OHADA arbitration system and assess 
whether or not it can effectively settle investment disputes. Finally chapter five will 















CHAPTER TWO:  STANDARDS OF PROTECTION IN OHADA 
2. INTRODUCTION 
OHADA does not regulate investment law. Indeed the OHADA Treaty defines business 
laws as ‘regulations concerning company law, definition and classification of legal 
persons engaged in trade, proceedings in respect of credits and recovery of debts, means 
of enforcement, bankruptcy, receivership and arbitration’.84 It further includes 
employment law, accounting law, transportation and sales laws and any other matter the 
Council of Ministers would decide unanimously as falling within the definition of 
business law.85 Therefore investment law may not be covered under OHADA at present 
but it is not impossible for the Council of Ministers to include it since art 2 of the Treaty 
empowers it to do so.86  
The fact that investment law is not included among the matters governed by the 
Treaty87 does not mean that OHADA space is devoid of any investment laws. In fact all 
OHADA member states have investment codes. Sub-regional organisations found within 
the OHADA geographic area such as the Economic and Monetary Community of 
Central Africa (CEMAC) and the Economic and Monetary Union of Western Africa 
(UEMOA) also have investment charters.88 At the regional level the Common Market for 
the Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) also has an investment code.89 Due to lack 
of accessible information on the UEMOA investment code this chapter will focus on 
CEMAC. COMESA will equally not be discussed because OHADA and COMESA only 
share one common member, the Democratic Republic of Congo, whereas all CEMAC 
member states are also members of OHADA.90 
                                                          
84 Art 2 of the OHADA Treaty adopted on 17 October 1993 at Port Louis published in the Official Journal 
No 4 of 01 November 1997. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Art 2 of the OHADA Treaty allows the Council of Ministers to include any matter within the ambit of 
business law provided it is decided unanimously to do so. 
87 OHADA Treaty.  
88 CEMAC Charte des Investissements, Règlement No 17 /99/CEMAC-20-CM-03 du 17 décembre 1999 
and UEMOA code Communautaire des Investissements. 
89 Investment Agreement for the COMESA common investment area. 
90 All UEMOA member states are also OHADA members but the chapter will mainly focus on CEMAC 
as no information could be found on UEMOA investment code.  
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All these codes and charters either at the national, regional or sub regional level 
provide for protection of investments. Investors within the OHADA space are spoiled 
for choice since there are several laws they can rely on for protection. However it is 
precisely the multiplicity of laws and membership to regional organisations as well as 
the lack of a clear relationship between these laws especially on matters that are jointly 
regulated that create confusion and uncertainty of outcome. Such uncertainty will 
encourage forum shopping hence defeating ‘legal and judicial security’ which are the 
pillars of OHADA. Priso pointed out: 
  ‘… Fact remains that the observation of the development of the two groups of rules - 
community on the one hand and harmonised on the other- dissipates little fear of a paradoxical 
effect radically opposed to the objective: while this double balancing, dual-scale modernisation 
aims to secure such foreign investment by improving legal certainty in the legal orders of the 
states concerned, it is at the same time source of legal insecurity resulting so much from both the 
competition of rules produced than from intersection of actions and jurisdictional structures 
ensuring their application... the security of business through legal certainty is sometimes lost in 
the maze of the relationship between community and harmonised law…’91 
CEMAC states’ investment codes offer a few guarantees to foreign investors 
such as non-discrimination, freedom to invest in the country regardless of nationality, 
protection of intellectual property rights, national treatment, and recourse to arbitration 
to resolves disputes and the enforcement of arbitral awards. The protection granted 
under these national and sub-regional laws do not seem extensive and can hardly be said 
to be attractive to investors.  
However BITs signed by CEMAC states with other countries guarantee a level 
of protection that is much higher than that found in national legislation. The formulation 
of these guarantees will determine the interpretation by arbitral tribunals in respect of 
liability and the obligations that such guarantees give rise to. Some formulations are too 
taxing on states especially developing states92 while others seem to strike a balance 
between the foreign investor’s rights and those of the states.  
                                                          
91 SJ Priso- Essawe ‘Les “espaces juridiques” de sécurisation des investissements en Afrique: entre droit 
communautaire et droit uniforme’ (2010) Revue LAMY Droit Civil 60. 
92 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Fair and equitable treatment’ (2012) UNCTAD 
Series on issues in international investment agreements II at xiii. 
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2.1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEMAC AND OHADA  
As mentioned above CEMAC and UEMOA each have an investment charter and though 
these two regional organisations do not share member states, they both share them with 
OHADA. All UEMOA and CEMAC countries are members of OHADA.93 The 
confusion brought about by the existence of two investment charters, which appear to be 
independent, within the same geographic area can potentially create clashes in areas that 
are jointly regulated thus threatening the judicial and legal certainty OHADA is trying to 
achieve. Consequently there will be different interpretations by national and community 
judges as to the applicable law and the manner it is to be applied.  
The question of the relationship between OHADA law and the national law of 
member states was resolved by the decision of the Senegalese Constitutional Council in 
1993.94 The Council explained that divesting the Senegalese ‘court of cassation’95 and 
National Assembly of certain powers in favour of OHADA and the Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration neither alters the international status of Senegal as a sovereign 
and independent state nor does it modify its institutional organisation. It pointed out that 
the divestment was not a total surrender of sovereignty but a limitation of competence 
that is incidental to every international commitment.96 It therefore concluded that arts 
14, 15, 16 and any other provision of the OHADA Treaty were not contrary to the 
Senegalese Constitution.  
The same cannot be said of the relationship between OHADA and CEMAC law. 
The hierarchical relationship between these two organisations is a matter that is yet to be 
settled. The few decisions of the CEMAC court of justice nevertheless tend to suggest 
that the latter is willing to recognise the supremacy of OHADA law over that of 
CEMAC’s in matters regulated by OHADA. In fact the CEMAC court of Justice 
                                                          
93 UEMOA members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo; CEMAC countries are Cameroun, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea and Chad; OHADA countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Camroun, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo and Democratic Republic of Congo. 
94 Cour Constitutionelle du Sénégal, arrêt No 3/C/93 du 16 décembre 1993, Penant No 827. 
95 The Court of Cassation is found in countries with a Civil Law tradition. It is a quashing court that has 
the same jurisdiction as an English Court of appeal. It only hears matters of law and not of fact. 
96 Décision du Conseil Constitutionel du Sénégal, Arrêt No 3/C/93 du 16 décembre 1993 para 8. 
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pronounced judgements on the supremacy of OHADA law over CEMAC law97 and its 
lack of competence to decide on matters regulated by OHADA.98 It is worth mentioning 
that CEMAC and OHADA are autonomous organisations. There is no legal nexus 
between their laws and their respective supranational courts. Nguepjo, in respect of both 
courts, observed: 
‘In addition to their independence vis-à-vis other institutions and bodies of the Community, the 
supranational courts of CEMAC and OHADA co-exist and run in parallel due to the 
independence of each of them and the supreme power that each holds’99 
The Cooperation Agreement between CEMAC and OHADA signed in 2001100 focuses 
more on the relationship between member states than the judicial institutions. It does not 
address the issue of hierarchy in the application of CEMAC and OHADA norms and 
incidentally the decisions of their respective courts.101 Art 3 of the Agreement provides 
mainly for reciprocal representation and participation to ministerial meetings, workshops 
organised by Commissions and technical bodies of each organisation when questions of 
common interest are addressed.102 
Though OHADA’s geographic coverage is much larger than that of CEMAC and 
UEMOA, its scope is narrow. It focuses solely on harmonisation of business laws while 
UEMOA and CEMAC intend to create respectively a common market103 and an 
economic and monetary union.104 However these sub regional organisations pursue the 
same objectives as OHADA.105 Thus the multiplicity of laws and lack of clear 
                                                          
97 Cour de Justice de la CEMAC, Chambre Judiciaire, Avis sur l’avant projet de règlement CEMAC relatif 
aux systèmes, moyens et incidents de payment Rec, pp9 to19. 
98 Cour de Justice de la CEMAC, Chambre Judiciaire, Arrêt No 003/CJ/CEMAC/CJ/03 du 03/07/2003. 
Affaire Tasha Loweh Lawrence contre Decision COBAC D-2000/22 et Amity Bank Cameroon PLC 
(recourse n annulation de la decision COBAC D-2000/22. P. 7. 
99 JF Nguepjo  Le role des juridictions supranationales de la CEMAC et de l’OHADA dans l’intégration 
des droits communautaires par les Etats membres PhD (Université Panthéon- Assas) (2011) 66 
100 Accord de Coopération entre l’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires 
(OHADA) et la Communauté Economique et Monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) signé a Douala 
le 3 Août 2001. 
101 JM Kobila ‘Les Rapport entre la cour de justice de la CEMAC et la cour commune de justice et 
d’arbitrage de l’OHADA’ available at 
http://afrilex.ubordeaux4.fr/sites/afrilex/IMG/pdf/Communication_Mouangue_Kobila.pdf, accessed on 22 
December 2014. 
102 Art 3 of the CEMAC- OHADA Cooperation Agreement. 
103
 Art 4 UEMOA Constitutive Treaty. 
104 Art 2 CEMAC Treaty of 16th March 1994 revised on 25th June 2008. 
105 2nd paragraph of the preamble to the CEMAC Treaty and Art 1 of the OHADA Treaty, art 4 of the 
UEMOA Treaty and art 2 of the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa Convention; Samuel 
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relationship between them as well as their enforcement institutions defeat these 
objectives.       
2.2. STANDARDS OF PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The CEMAC Investment Charter regulates foreign investments within CEMAC region 
and is directly applicable in all CEMAC member states.106 Member states however have 
the possibility to enact national laws that may specify and complement the Code without 
contradicting or derogating from it.107 The Code provides for standards of protection of 
foreign investment such as recourse to arbitration and enforcement of arbitral awards108, 
uniform and equitable application of the rules of the game109, administrative 
expediency110, national treatment111, non-discrimination112, transparency113, and 
protection of intellectual property rights114.  
Similarly the Chadian Investment Charter115, which is the most recent national 
investment legislation in the CEMAC region, provides for uniform and equitable 
application of competition and consumer protection rules116; freedom to undertake 
private investment subject to the respect of economic and social policies of the state 
regarding health; security and preservation of the environment117; free transfer or 
repatriation of capital118; national treatment in respect of participation in public tenders 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Jacques Priso pointed out that: ‘among the objectives of WAEMU and CEMAC, figure the strengthening 
of the competitiveness of economic and financial activities of the member states in a rationalized and 
harmonized legal environment or by harmonizing the rules that contribute to the improvement of the 
business environment. The issue of harmonization and modernization of law is therefore present in 
OHADA as well as the two economic communities’. 
106 Art 41 CEMAC Treaty. 
107 Preamble to the CEMAC Investment Charter Art 30 of the Charter provides that the Community 
Charter may be supplemented by national laws without derogating from its essential provisions  
108 Art 5 CEMAC Treaty in this context imposes an obligation on States to encourage recourse to 
arbitration and guarantee enforcement of awards in the framework of legal and judicial security. 
109 Art 6.  
110 Art 8. 
111 Art 9. 
112 Art 10 (3). 
113 Art 11. 
114 Art 12. 
115 Charte des Investissements du Tchad, Loi No 006/ PR/2008 du 3 Janvier 2008. 
116 Art 7. 
117 Art 11. 
118 Art 12. 
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labour laws, taxes and  acquisition of intellectual property rights119; settlement of 
investment disputes through arbitration120.  
The Congolese Investment Charter121 provides for the same types of treatment 
namely non-discrimination122; equal treatment regarding competition rules123; free 
transfer of capital by foreign investors124; improving the quality of information given to 
investors on the country’s economic condition and social development125; recourse to 
arbitration and guarantee of enforcement of awards126. 
As a general rule a claim will arise under a BIT if the economic activity in 
respect of which it arose qualifies as an investment. Similarly a dispute can only be 
brought before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) if the dispute arises out of an investment.127  Several arbitral tribunals 
endeavoured to define the term ‘investment’. The Salini tribunal identifies four elements 
of an investment namely: contribution in asset or money, duration, risk and contribution 
to the economic development of the host state.128 Several tribunals disagreed with that 
assessment and narrowed the elements of investment to contribution in asset or money, 
duration and risk.129 These requirements prevent investors bringing short term and 
potentially risky activities from claiming protection under a BIT.    
The CEMAC investment Charter and the investment codes of some of its 
member states omitted certain standards that are found in BITs such as fair and equitable 
                                                          
119 Art 13, art 15, 16, 17 and 18. 
120 Art 30. 
121 Chartre des Investissements de la Republique du Congo, Loi No 6-2003 du 18 Janvier 2003. 
122 Art 16 (3). 
123 Art 6. 
124 Art 3. 
125 Art 10. 
126 Art 12 and 37. 
127 Art 25 (1) ICSID Convention  
128 Salini Construttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A v Kingdom of Morocco (2001), ICSID case No 
ARB/00/4 para 52. 
129 Romak S.A. (Switzerland) v the Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No AA28, para 207; Quiborax S.A., 
Non Metallic Minerals S.A. & Allan Fosk Kaplún v Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No 
ARB/06/2 para 227.  
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treatment, full protection and security among others. These standards offer a higher level 
of protection sometimes to the detriment of developing host states.130  
The main standards of treatment found in BITs are fair and equitable treatment, 
full protection and security, national treatment, most favoured nation treatment, 
protection against expropriation, transfer or repatriation of funds and protection against 
arbitrary and discriminatory measures.131 The formulations of these standards differ 
from one BIT to another and there is no consistency of interpretation. Understanding the 
effect of each of these standards will help assess the position of CEMAC countries vis-à-
vis foreign investors in the international arena.  
2.2.1. Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) is one of the most controversial concepts arbitral 
tribunals and host states have been confronted with. Fair and equitable treatment 
includes aspects of equity and balancing, it requires: 
‘[an] attitude of governance based on an unbiased set of rules that should be applied with a 
view to doing justice to all interested parties that may be affected by a state’s decision in 
question including the host state’s population at large’132 
The concept was introduced for the purpose of filling gaps and provides for situations 
that were not contemplated by more specific provisions in the BITs.133 
There is no consistent interpretation of the concept and issues as to the content of 
fair and equitable treatment are equally controversial.134 Vandevelde, however, is of the 
opinion that arbitral awards have created a unified theory of fair and equitable treatment 
founded on the procedural and substantive dimensions of the rule of law.135 He 
identified five principles that make out the concept of fair and equitable treatment 
namely reasonableness, consistency, non-discrimination, due process and 
                                                          
130 Sornarajah observed that developing countries are prepared to accord higher standards of treatment in 
BITs to foreign investors than that provided for in national legislations in the hope of attracting 
investment. 
131 The Umbrella clause will not be considered in this chapter as the majority of BITs examined did not 
include it. They were found in only two BITs between the United States and some of the OHADA states. 
132 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development op cit (n92) 7. 
133 Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer Principles of international investment law (2008) 122.  
134 Roland Kläger Fair and equitable treatment in international law investment law (2011) 76. 




transparency.136 He acknowledged however that though the principle of transparency has 
been cited in a few cases there is no coherent theory on the issue yet.137  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) identified five 
elements of the fair and equitable treatment standard namely prohibition of manifest 
arbitrariness in decision making, prohibition of denial of justice and disregard of 
fundamental principles of due process, prohibition of targeted discrimination, 
prohibition of abusive treatment of investors and the protection of the investor’s 
legitimate expectations.138  
The investor’s legitimate expectation is a key element of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard in respect of which a claim will arise when a regulatory or policy 
change made by the host state adversely affects the investment.139 Some arbitral 
tribunals interpreted ‘legitimate expectation’ radically to the extent that any changes 
made by the host state to the legal regime that adversely affects a foreign investment 
would constitute a breach of the investor’s legitimate expectation.140  They argued that 
the stability and predictability of the legal and business framework was one of the 
essential elements of the FET standard.141 Legitimate expectation may arise from a 
specific promise made by the host state to the investor such as a stabilisation clause or 
from rules and regulations not directly addressed to the investor but put in place to 
attract investment.142 
Other tribunals, however, have taken a much more nuanced approach and found 
that the legitimate expectation should be based on the political, socio economic, cultural 
and historical conditions prevailing in the host state.143 Moreover investors also have an 
obligation to enquire into the policies and legal framework of the host state before 
making the investment. If the investor knew the host state to be a high risk country then 
                                                          
136 Vandevelde op cit (n135) 104 to 105. 
137 ibid. 
138 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development op cit (n92) xv to xvi. 
139 Adverse effect here can be understood as the reduction of the economic value of the investment 
140 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development op cit (n92). 
141 Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v Ecuador, London Court of International Arbitration case 
No UN 3467, Final award 1 July 2004;  PSGE Global et al v Republic of Turkey, ICSID case No 
ARB/02/5 19 January 2007; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/01/8, award 12 
May 2005. 
142 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development op cit (n92) 86. 
143 Duke Energy v Ecuador, ICSID case No ARB/04/19 award 18 August 2008. 
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it cannot have the same expectations had the investment been made in a stable country. 
The arbitral tribunal in Parkerings- compagniet v Lithuania observed that ‘no 
expectation that the law will remain unchanged would be legitimate because Lithuania 
was a country in political transition. By investing in Lithuania despite its situation the 
investor accepts the business risk of instability’.144 Tribunals have further recognised the 
need to balance between investors’ legitimate expectations and the host state’s 
regulatory powers provided the latter are exercised bona fide and in the public 
interest.145 
The interpretation of the liability threshold in a FET146 clause has differed 
depending on how it has been formulated. There are two types of FET clauses that are 
commonly used in BITs namely the qualified and unqualified fair and equitable 
treatment standard. 
The qualified fair and equitable treatment standard is linked to the international 
minimum standard. It is usually formulated in BITs as granting fair and equitable 
treatment in accordance with the international minimum standard. The Gabon-Turkey 
BIT (not in force) provides: 
‘Investments of investors [...] shall [...] be accorded treatment according to international 
minimum standard of treatment including fair and equitable treatment…’147 
The Congo-United States BIT (in force) similarly stipulates that ‘investments shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall in no case be accorded 
treatment less than that required by international law’.148  The tribunal in Azurix v 
Argentina observed that the sentence ‘in no case be accorded treatment less than that 
required by international law’ sets a higher standard than that required by international 
law. It further stated that such a sentence sets a floor and not a ceiling in order to avoid a 
possible interpretation of these standards below what is required by international law.149  
                                                          
144 Parkerings- Compagniet v Lithuania, ICSID case No ARB/05/8 award 11 September 2007 para 335 
to336. 
145 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Rules, Partial award of 17 March 2006. 
146 Fair and equitable treatment.  
147 Art 3 (1) Gabon- Turkey BIT signed in 2012 not in force. 
148 Art 2 (2) Congo- USA BIT signed in 1990 entered into force in 1994. 
149 Azurix v Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/01/12 award of 14th July 2006 at para 361. 
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The consequence of the qualified FET will be that first the host state must not 
grant an investor a treatment below that provided for under international law. 
International law becomes the standard below which the host state cannot go.150 
Secondly the liability threshold of the host state will be high. The claimant carries a 
heavy burden to prove that a practice has risen to international standard; in other words 
has become state practice; and that the host state has violated it.151The host state would 
therefore be liable for grave, egregious or shocking conduct or as the tribunal in the Neer 
case put it: 
 ‘…the treatment an alien should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty or 
to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every 
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its insufficiency.’152 
Unqualified FET is not linked to international law and is interpreted 
autonomously according to its ordinary meaning.153 The danger of such a clause is that 
any state conduct can be labelled contrary to the fair and equitable treatment if the 
tribunal is of the opinion that it is. The liability threshold is therefore much lower. The 
unqualified FET ties the host state’s hands and can potentially trespass its ‘domaine 
réservé’154.  A number of BITs signed by CEMAC states favour an unqualified FET 
standard over the qualified one despite the fact that it would put them in a very 
precarious position.155 
                                                          
150 Kläger op cit (n134); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ‘ Fair and equitable 
treatment standard in international investment law’, OECD Working Papers on International Investments, 
September 2004, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435, accessed on 25 November 2014 
151 The UNCTAD argued that given the fact that the minimum standard of treatment of aliens forms part 
of customary international law a claimant would carry a heavy burden of demonstrating general and 
consistent state practice and opinio juris in order to show that the minimum standard of treatment 
incorporates a certain minimum requirement. 
152 L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States (1926) 60, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards Vol. IV; Sornarajah op cit (n6) 151. 
153 Art 3(1) Cameroun- Egypt BIT (2000) not in force; Art 2 (2) Cameroun- United Kingdom BIT (1982) 
in force; Art 2 (2) Central African Republic- Morocco BIT (2006) not in force; Art 3(1) Congo-China BIT 
(2000) not in force; Art 2 (2) Congo-Germany BIT (2010) not in force. 
154 ‘Domaine réservé’ here is understood as the areas that are the sole prerogative of the State; United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development op cit (n92) 10. 
155 Gabon- Morocco BIT (2004) in force; Equatorial Guinea- Morocco BIT (2005) not in force; Congo-
Germany BIT (2010) not in force;  Congo-China BIT (2000) not in force; Chad-Guinea BIT (2004) not in 
force; Central African Republic-Germany BIT (1965) not in force; Central African Republic-Switzerland 
BIT (1973) in force; Cameroon-United Kingdom BIT (1982) in force, available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/34, accessed on 12 November 2014 
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While arbitral tribunals are in agreement that an investor should expect that the 
host state keeps a consistent legal and policy framework they also acknowledge that host 
states have a right to regulate provided it is done in the public interest and is not 
discriminatory.  As the Tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic pointed out it would be 
unreasonable for an investor to expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made remain totally unchanged unless the State has signed a stabilisation 
clause or has given an explicit promise to maintain a particular state of affairs so that the 
investor relies on the promise when making the investment.156 The tribunal in EDF v 
Romania held that: 
‘… except where specific promises or representations are made by the state to the investor, the 
latter may not rely on a bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk 
of any changes in the host state’s legal and economic framework…’157 
 Some BITs like the Gabon-Turkey BIT (not in force) provide for general exceptions 
that allow contracting parties to make rules for the protection of human, animal or plant 
life; for the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible resources or again 
exception related to the disclosure of information that may jeopardise the security of the 
country.158However, generally CEMAC countries do not include exception clauses in 
their BITs. 
2.2.2. Full Protection and Security Standard 
The full protection and security clause refers to physical protection or protection from 
acts of government and non-government actors.159 It connotes a proactive attitude of the 
host state to protect the investment from actions of its organs or those of third parties.160 
Some tribunals defined it as the ‘taking of all possible measures to prevent the killings 
and destruction of the investment’.161 It is not a guarantee that the investment will never, 
                                                          
156 Saluka v Czech Republic supra (n145); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development op cit 
(n92) 67; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/01/8, award 12 May 2005.  
157 EDF v Romania, ICSID case No ARB/05/13, award of 8 October 2009. 
158 Art 5 of the Gabon- Turkey BIT signed in 2012 not in force. 
159 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 149. 
160 Ibid.  
161 Asian Agricultural Product Ltd v Republic of Sri Lanka ICSID Case No ARB/87/3; The tribunal in 
American Manufacturing and Trading (AMT). Inc v Zaire (ICSID case No Arb/93/1 award 21 February 
1997) found that Zaire should take all measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of protection and 
security of the investment. In other words Zaire should show that it has taken all measures of precaution to 
protect the investment of AMT in its territory. 
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in any circumstances, be occupied, disturbed or destroyed.162 In addition the majority of 
BITs further provide for compensation for loss during wars, civil strife and other related 
events.163  
The purpose of the standard, according to Schreuer and Dolzer, is the need to 
protect the investor against various types of physical violence including invasion of the 
premises of the investment.164 Sornarajah sees it as a concept with two sides: on one side 
the state should refrain from using its forces to harm the foreign investor’s property 
while on the other side the state should give protection from violence to the investment 
if such violence could be reasonably anticipated.165 This provision is essential in cases 
where the investor is targeting high risk countries in terms of wars and civil unrest. 
African countries and therefore OHADA countries figure among them.  
The standard of full protection and security differs from fair and equitable 
treatment in that while the latter restrains the state from acting in a particular way or 
taking certain steps, the former requires host states to take action.166 The standard is 
qualified however. Host states do not have a strict obligation to prevent violence. They 
are supposed to exercise ‘due diligence’ and take measures that are reasonable under the 
circumstances.167 The majority of arbitral tribunals have been unwilling to associate the 
level of due diligence expected from states with the resources available.168 However the 
Pantechniki Tribunal conceded that the extent of a state’s duty under the full protection 
and security clause depended, to some extent, on the resources available to the host state. 
It therefore held that the Albanian authorities had not breached their full protection and 
security obligation since they could not control the magnitude of the social unrest.169 It 
however warned that the state’s resources factor will only be considered when there has 
                                                          
162 International Court of Justice, Case concerning Elettronica Sicula (ELSI case), 20 July 1989, ICJ Rep 
(1989). 
163 Art 7 of the Gabon- Turkey BIT (2012); art 3 (3) Congo- USA BIT (1994); art 5 Chad – Lebanon 
(2004); art 3 (3) Central African Republic – Germany BIT (1965). 
164 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 149. 
165 Sornarajah op cit (n6) 237. 
166 M Mahnaz ‘Full protection and security standard comes of age: Yet another challenge for State in 
investment treaty arbitration’ (2011) IISD 11. 
167 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 150; Noble Ventures v Romania ICSID case No ARB/01/11, award of 
12 October 2005. 
168 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 150. 
169 Pantechniki v Albania ICSID Case No ARB/07/21, award of 30 July 2009. 
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been physical damage to the investment but not when the contention is based on a 
‘denial of justice’ claim. In such a case lack of sufficient resources to ensure the 
protection of the investment is no defence.170 
While some arbitral tribunals have restricted the scope of the full protection 
clause to physical security of aliens under customary international law171 others have 
widened it to more than just physical protection and extended it to legal and commercial 
protection.172 The Siemens Tribunal based its argument on the fact that intangible assets, 
which are protected under BITs, cannot be protected physically.173  The Azurix tribunal 
relied on the ordinary meaning of the word ‘full’ and argued that the use of the formula 
‘full’ protection and security without qualifying it implies protection that goes beyond 
physical security.174  The full protection and security standard, like the fair and equitable 
standard, can impinge on the ‘domaine reservé’ of the state when arbitral tribunals 
extend it to the state’s regulatory powers.175 Other tribunals however have recognised 
the right of a state as a sovereign to regulate in good faith and for public interest even if 
such regulation is detrimental to the investment.176 Therefore some BITs specifically 
reserve the right to introduce measures for public order even if such measures may be 
contrary to the full protection and security clause. For instance the Equatorial Guinea-
Morocco BIT (not in force) provides for the right to full protection and security subject 
to measures that are strictly necessary for the maintenance of public order.177 
The claimant has to prove that the host state took no effective measures to 
prevent or redress the harm done to the investment.178 The test applied for the 
interpretation of the full protection and security clause would therefore be whether the 
                                                          
170 Pantechniki v Albania supra (n169) at para77. 
171 Noble Ventures v Romania supra (n167); Gabon- Turkey BIT signed in 2012 but not in force; Congo- 
USA BIT in force in 1990. 
172 The arbitral tribunal in Biwater v Tanzania (2008) stated that full protection and security implies a 
State’s guarantee of stability in a secure environment physical, commercial and legal. Para 729. 
173 Siemens AG v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007.  
174 Azurix Corporation v The Argentine Republic supra (n149). The Full protection and security standard 
may be breached even if there was no physical violence. 
175 CME Czech Republic BV (the Netherlands) v Czech Republic UNCITRAL Rules, partial award 13 
September 2001. 
176 AES v Hungary ICSID Case No ARB/02/17, award 23 September 2010. 
177 Art 2 (2) of the Equatorial Guinea-Morocco BIT signed in 2005 but not in force; See also art 2 (2) of 
the Central African Republic-Egypt BIT signed in 2000 not in force. 
178 Wena hotels Ltd (UK) v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID case No Arb/98/4 award December 2000 
reprinted in 41 I.L.M 896 (2002). 
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state took reasonable measures of prevention which a well administered government 
could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.179  This standard of proof, it 
is submitted, is too taxing on CEMAC countries the majority of which are developing 
countries in crisis thus not well administered. In this context the Pantechniki test referred 
to above may be more appropriate. 
2.2.3. National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
BITs also contain provisions on national treatment and most favoured nation 
treatment.180 The former advocates for treatment not less favourable than that accorded 
to nationals of the host state while the latter provides for treatment not less favourable 
than that accorded to third parties with whom the host state has signed BITs.181  
The national treatment clause in a BIT implies that there can be no 
discrimination between foreign and domestic investors in the host state’s territory even 
if there is an economically valid reason for such discrimination.182 
The inclusion of the MFN treatment clause in a BIT implies that any benefit that 
the host state extends to a third party is automatically extended to the other party to the 
BIT provided that investors are ‘in like circumstances’.183 The Congo-United States BIT 
(in force) allows parties to exclude certain sectors from the application of MFN and 
national treatment but cautions that such exception should be kept to a minimum.184 The 
Congo-Germany BIT (not in force) defines treatment that is less favourable and includes 
an exception to the rule especially when measures are taken for security or public order 
purposes.185  
                                                          
179 AAPL v Sri Lanka supra (n161). 
180 Most Favoured Nation treatment is also known as the MFN treatment. 
181 Art 3 Cameroon-United Kingdom BIT (1985) in force; art 3 (1) Cameroon-Egypt BIT (2000) not in 
force; art 2 of the Central African Republic-Germany BIT (1965) not in force; art 3 (2) and (3) Congo-
China BIT (2000) not in force. 
182 Sornarajah op cit (n6) 235. 
183 In Bayindir v Pakistan ICSID Case No ARB/03/29, award of 27 August 2005. the tribunal found that a 
MFN clause would permit the invocation of a fair and equitable treatment clause contained in another 
BIT. 
184 Art 2 (1) Congo-United States BIT (1994) in force. 
185 Art 3(2) Congo- Germany BIT (2010) not in force. 
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There is no consensus on the interpretation of the MFN clause. Some tribunals 
give it a wide scope and find that it has to apply to all substantive issues in a BIT186 
while others are of the opinion that it should be interpreted bearing in mind the intention 
of the parties.187  A mechanical application of the MFN clause will have the effect of 
undermining the negotiations between the parties and their intentions.188 It might grant 
more protection than that intended by the parties or again include certain matters that 
were deliberately left out.189 There is also a danger that foreign investors can rely on 
benefits granted by multilateral or regional agreements. Parties to BITs have tried to 
prevent such extension of the national treatment and MFN clause by explicitly excluding 
their application to agreements such as those related to free trade areas, customs unions 
and double taxation agreements.190 
The MFN and national treatment clause should not be confused with the non-
discrimination clause that is found in a large number of BITs.191 The clause usually 
prohibits discriminatory and arbitrary measures.192 UNCTAD pointed out that while 
MFN and National treatment guarantee non-discrimination on nationality grounds, the 
non-discrimination clause protects foreign investors against discrimination based on 
factors other than nationality such as religion, race, gender, political affiliation and 
disabilities among other things.193 The non-discrimination clause protects foreign 
investors against measures taken by the host state that are specifically targeting them.194 
The impact of the measure or action on the investment will be the factor that will be 
                                                          
186 Dolzer and Schreuer argued that the MFN clause will operate only to the extent that the provision in the 
other treaty is compatible in principle with the scheme negotiated by the parties in the basic treaty and 
departs from it only in a detail consistent with that broad scheme. But they also acknowledged that there 
would be a chance that the clause would be interpreted literally and therefore apply to all areas of other 
treaties regardless of the compatibility between them. 
187 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 186-187. 
188 Ibid.  
189 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 190-191. Sornarajah similarly argued: ‘the inclusion of the MFN 
presents the difficulty that the foreign investor could latch onto more favourable treatment provided for in 
past or future treaties than what was bargained for’.  
190 Art 3(3) Equatorial Guinea-Morocco BIT (2005) not in force; art 4 (4) (b) Gabon-Turkey BIT (2012) 
not in force; art 1 Central African Republic-Switzerland (1973) in force; art 7 Cameroon-United Kingdom 
BIT (1985) in force. 
191 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development op cit (n92) 82. 
192 Some BITs prohibit discriminatory and unjustified measures or unreasonable and discriminatory 
measures. 
193 Op cit (n116); Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 176. 
194 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development op cit (n92) 82. 
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considered when determining whether or not it is discriminatory. The state’s intention is 
irrelevant.195 The tribunal in LG&E v Argentina however found that one could consider 
either the intent or the effect of the measure.196 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) defined arbitrariness as ‘a wilful disregard to 
due process of law, an act which shocks or at least surprises a sense of judicial 
propriety’197 The tribunal in LG&E v Argentina described an arbitrary measure as ‘a 
measure that affects the investments of nationals of the other party without engaging in 
a rational decision making process. The process in question involves considering the 
effect of the decision on the investor and balancing the interest of the state with any 
burden imposed on such investment’.198 
2.2.4. Transfer of funds 
A significant number of BITs allow foreign investors to freely repatriate profits to their 
home state or to freely transfer funds in and out of the host state according to exchange 
rules in force at the time of the transfer.199 Such right is formulated in absolute terms in 
the majority of CEMAC BITs examined.200 This, it has been argued, is very 
inconvenient because moving funds in and out of the country without control may 
destabilise the country’s financial market.201 Host states cannot assume or hope that 
financial crisis will never occur. Crises such as exchange shortfalls necessitating 
currency control do occur and the doctrine of necessity allows the state to intervene in 
such situations at the risk of infringing the investor’s absolute right of repatriation.202 
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 Siemens AG v Argentina supra (n172). 
196 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 178. 
197 ELSI case supra (n162) 15 at 76. 
198 LG&E v Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006. 
199 The repatriation clause will usually include not only the profits that are made out of the investment but 
also other payments such as fees or other entitlements that are paid to foreign investors and their 
employees. 
200 The majority of BITs signed by CEMAC countries have provisions such as the one found in art 4 of the 
Chad-Germany BIT in force since 1967 which grants the right to free transfer of funds with no exceptions. 
201  Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 91 observed that experience has shown that sudden short term capital 
inflows and especially capital flight may lead to instability in the domestic financial markets. 
202 Sornarajah argued absolute rights of repatriation cannot bind a State in times of financial stringency 
such as extreme balance of payment difficulties. 
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BITs such as the Cameroon-United Kingdom BIT (in force) provide for exceptions to 
the right to repatriate funds in times of exceptional financial crisis.203 
2.2.5. Expropriation 
Expropriation is defined as the governmental taking or modification of an individual’s 
property rights especially by eminent domain.204  It ‘connotes the taking by a 
governmental type authority of a person’s property with a view to transferring 
ownership of that property to the authority that exercised its de jure or de facto power to 
do the taking’205 Therefore expropriation in the context of international investment law 
is understood as the compulsory taking of the foreign investor’s property without its 
consent by the state in the public interest.           
BITs guarantee against discriminatory expropriation or nationalisation and 
generally stipulate that such expropriation should be done for public interest reasons 
subject to compensation.206 Some of the BITs signed by CEMAC states with Germany, 
France and Lebanon include full protection and security clauses immediately before 
expropriation clauses207 suggesting that the standard should be applied in expropriation 
disputes. The formulation of compensation differs from one BIT to another. Some 
provide for prompt adequate and effective compensation at fair market value208, others 
provide for just compensation209 or just and equitable compensation210 while others 
provide for compensation equivalent to the value of the investment211. 
                                                          
203 Art 6 of the Cameroon-United Kingdom BIT provides for repatriation of funds subject to restrictions in 
exceptional financial circumstances exercised in good faith. See also art 8 (3) of the Gabon- Turkey BIT 
204 Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. 
205 B El Attar, BY Li, D Kessler et al ‘ Expropriation clauses in international investment agreements and 
the appropriate room for host state to enact regulations: A practical guide for States and investors’ 




f, accessed on 27 January 2015 footnote omitted. 
206 Sornarajah op cit (n6) 240;  Art 6 (2) of the Gabon Turkey BIT provides that non-discriminatory legal 
measures designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives such as health, safety and 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation. 
207 Equatorial Guinea- France BIT (in force); Congo-Germany BIT (not in force); Chad-Lebanon BIT (not 
in force); Chad-Germany BIT (in force); Central African Republic-Germany BIT (not in force). 
208 This formulation is widely used compared to the others and is otherwise known as the ‘hull formula’.  




The majority of CEMAC states’ BITs examined in this chapter have provided for 
unqualified fair and equitable treatment which has a low liability threshold. The 
interpretation of this clause by arbitral tribunals has generally been pro investor in that 
the standard of proof is much lower than if the fair and equitable treatment standard was 
linked to the international minimum standard. If linked to international law, the claimant 
will have to prove that a particular obligation has gained international recognition and 
that the state has breached that obligation. As will be discussed in chapter three below, 
certain states have attempted to limit the scope of the FET standard. For instance the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued Notes of Interpretation that linked the FET 
standard and the full protection and security standard to the international law minimum 
standard of treatment.  
The full protection and security standard has also given rise to wide 
interpretations by extending it not only to physical protection but also to legal and 
commercial protection. Such a standard may be too demanding on states that do not have 
the means to ensure both especially those countries scourged with wars and civil unrest.  
Most of CEMAC BITs examined except for one signed with the United Kingdom and 
another with Turkey212 grant absolute right of transfer of fund which has been criticised 
as impractical. Indeed such a provision may be problematic during financial crisis that 
may push a state to take measures that contravene it.  
The MFN treatment may also prove to be problematic if interpreted too broadly and 
formulated without limitations. Investors may acquire advantages and protection that the 
state for one reason or another was not willing to give.  
Hence most of the guarantees as formulated in CEMAC states’ BITs examined 
do put these countries in a weak position vis-à-vis foreign investors, rendering them 
liable to investors in broad circumstances.  OHADA countries could therefore provide 
for exceptions to the right as in the Cameroon-United Kingdom BIT (in force).  
                                                                                                                                                                           
210 Art 4 (2) Equatorial Guinea-Morocco BIT (2005) signed but not in force; Art 4 (2) Central African 
Republic-Egypt BIT (2000) signed but not in force. 
211 Art 4 (1) Congo-China BIT (2000) not in force; Art 4 (2) Congo-Germany BIT (2010) not in force; Art 
3 (2) Chad-Germany BIT (1967) in force.  
212 Art 8 (3) Gabon-Turkey BIT 2012 not in force; art6 Cameroon-United Kingdom BIT 1982 in force. 
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Moreover it must be born in mind that the outcome of a case does not solely depend on 
treaty formulation. The interpretation given by arbitral tribunals also plays an important 
role. A certain trend may be observed in respect of arbitral awards but no consistency is 
assured because these tribunals are not bound by the principle of precedent. A very 
precise and predictable set of laws with clear interpretation rules like the North 
American Free Trade Agreement might be more beneficial to OHADA countries. 
In this chapter I have analysed some of the investment laws in the OHADA 
region and a number of BITs signed by OHADA states to determine the type of 
protection they are willing to grant foreign investors and now turn to models of 
harmonisation of investment laws in other jurisdictions to determine whether or not they 



















CHAPTER THREE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: NAFTA AND THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENT BILL 
3. INTRODUCTION 
Harmonisation of investment laws is not impossible. It has been undertaken in other 
jurisdictions. The United States, Canada and Mexico included an investment chapter in 
their free trade agreement (NAFTA). South Africa on the other hand has proposed 
adopting a different approach by putting all investments under the national regime. It 
would therefore be interesting to look at how these different jurisdictions have shaped 
their investment laws with respect to standards of protection and how well the system is 
functioning in order to assess whether or not they are viable models for OHADA.  
NAFTA213 is a trilateral arrangement between Canada, the United States and Mexico 
establishing a free trade area.214 When creating a free trade area parties commit 
themselves to removing tariffs among them but each country retains its own tariffs 
against non-members.215 Art 102 (1) (a) of NAFTA provides for elimination of barriers 
to trade in, and facilitation of cross border movement of goods and services between the 
territories of the parties.  
Analysing NAFTA investment protection framework with regard to an eventual 
inclusion of investment law within OHADA might seem farfetched considering the 
category of the countries considered, their economic development and their involvement 
in global trade. Indeed NAFTA is an agreement between two developed countries and 
one developing country whereas OHADA is the result of an agreement between least 
developed countries, a factor that says a lot about their level of economic development 
and their share in the global market.216 Moreover NAFTA is more inward looking. It 
                                                          
213 Otherwise known as NAFTA. 
214 Art 101 of NAFTA provides that the parties to the agreement consistent with the provision of art XXIV 
of the general agreement on tariffs and trade hereby establish a free trade area. 
215 M Lee ‘Regionalism in Africa: A part of the problem or a part of solution’ (2002) 9 Polis/ R.C.S.P/ 
C.P.S.R 3. 
216 According to the UNCTAD database 13 of the 17 OHADA member states are least developed 
countries. These are Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, DRC, Senegal, Chad and Togo available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/aldc/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-Developed-
Countries.aspx, accessed on 12 December 2014. 
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only applies to investments from contracting parties. 217 Investments by non NAFTA 
members in the NAFTA area will be subject to national laws of the country in which the 
investment is made. OHADA on the other hand has a more outward outlook and mainly 
targets foreign investors.218 
Nevertheless both OHADA and NAFTA have the common objective of 
increasing investments within their respective regions.219 NAFTA could therefore be a 
better example to follow because it does not cover just one sector like the Energy 
Charter Treaty220 but trade and investment. Its provisions, though identical to those 
found in BITs, will thus be more precise and clear and the interpretation of standards of 
treatment of investment much more uniform and predictable. 
Closer to home is the South African Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 
(PPIB) tabled in Parliament in 2013. If adopted it will repeal all bilateral treaties signed 
by South Africa and submit all foreign investments to the national regime. BITs, it is 
submitted, were designed to remedy the shortcomings of African national legislations 
which left much to be desired in terms of guarantees and protection of foreign 
investments.221 Reverting to national legislation portrays a confidence in the 
effectiveness and neutrality of the South African national legal framework on investment 
on the part of the state222 which foreign investors may not share as the legislation 
emphasises protection of the state’s regulatory space at the cost of protection of the 
                                                          
217 Art 1101 NAFTA. 
218 M Audit ‘Contrats publics et arbitrage international Administrative law, Bruylant 2011, available at 
http://www.ohada.com/content/newsletters/1320/contrat-public-et-arbitrage-international.pdf, accessed 
on 21 January 2015.  
219 Art 102 (1) (c) of NAFTA included the substantial increase of investment opportunities in the 
territories of the parties as one of the objectives of the agreement. Moreover the preamble to the 
Agreement provides that parties resolve to ensure a predictable commercial framework for business 
planning and investment. OHADA on its part recognised, in its constitutive treaty’s preamble, that it is 
essential that the harmonized law be applied with diligence in such conditions so as to guarantee legal 
stability of economic activities and encourage investment. 
220 The Energy Charter Treaty was signed in 1994 and legally entered into force in April 1998. It has 52 
signatories mostly from eastern and western Europe. It provides a multilateral framework for 
intergovernmental cooperation in the energy sector; Dolzer & Schreuer op cit (n133) 27. 
221 E Neumayer & L Spess ‘Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to 
developing countries?’ (2005) 33 World Development 1567 at 1570 & 1582; A Perry ‘An ideal legal 
system for attracting foreign direct investment? Some theory and reality’ (2000) 15 American University 
International Law Review 1627 at 1630 to 1631. 
222 Department of Trade and Industry South Africa ‘Why invest in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/trade_investment/why_invest_insa.jsp, accessed on 20 December 2014. 
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rights of foreign investors. Insistence on sovereign regulatory power may be an obstacle 
to foreign investors which OHADA is trying to overcome. Therefore South Africa’s 
investment Bill may not be the best model to follow although it has tried to redress the 
imbalance in the investor-state relationship.  
3.1. STANDARDS OF PROTECTION IN NAFTA 
NAFTA grants the same types of guarantees and protections found in BITs. The 
difference emerges in their application and interpretation. Hence the Agreement 
provides for national treatment, most favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable 
treatment, full protection and security, non-discriminatory treatment, transfer or 
repatriation of funds and compensation for expropriation and loss caused by wars and 
other related incidents.  
3.1.1. Fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security 
Art 1105 (1) enunciates the parties’ commitment: 
‘To accord to investments of investors of another party treatment in accordance with 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security’ 
This provision was initially interpreted to mean that, in addition to fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security, the investor of another party was 
entitled to the international minimum standard.223 Thus the tribunal in the Pope & Talbot 
case found that the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ 
standards were additive to the international minimum standard because the language of 
the treaty was analogous to that found in BITs. It argued that it was doubtful that parties 
intended to grant investors from NAFTA countries the minimum standard of treatment 
while granting a higher level of protection to investors from other countries.224 
This interpretation was retracted by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission which 
issued Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions in 2001. The Note is a 
                                                          
223 Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada, UNCITRAL Final Merits Award of 10 April 2001. 
224 Kläger op cit (n134) 68. 
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binding document meant to guide tribunals in their interpretation of the art 1105 (1)225 
and stipulated that: 
‘1. Article 1105 (1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investors of another 
party. 
2. The concept of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require 
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.’226 
The Interpretation Notes linked ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and 
security’ to the international minimum standard thus making international law minimum 
standard a standard below which treatment of investments should not go.227 Canada 
released a statement on implementation in which it stated that art 1105 is intended to 
assure a minimum standard of treatment of investments of NAFTA investors and that it 
provides for a minimum absolute standard of treatment based on long standing 
principles of customary international law.228 
Tribunals considered the Neer formula229 as the foundation of the international minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens. The tribunal in that case held that: 
‘In order to constitute an international delinquency, the treatment should amount to an 
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so 
far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily 
recognize its insufficiency’230  
The formula was widely criticised by tribunals as being out dated and not reflecting 
customary international law as it is today. In response to this other arbitral tribunals 
argued that the components of the formula remained substantially the same and 
                                                          
225 Art 1131 (2) NAFTA provides that an interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this 
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emphasised on the evolutionary character of customary international law.231 The United 
States also issued a statement about customary international law and pointed out that it 
[customary international law] is not frozen in time and that in fact the international 
minimum standard evolves such that the international minimum standard referred to in 
the Interpretation Notes is the standard as it is known today.232 Hence the tribunal in the 
ADF group case observed that: 
‘What customary international law projects is not a static photograph of the minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as it stood in 1927 when the award in the Neer case was 
rendered.  For both customary international law and the minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens it incorporates, are constantly in a process of development’233 
Therefore for a claimant to establish a breach of art 1105 (1) of NAFTA he must show 
that ‘the act in question is sufficiently egregious and shocking, a gross denial of justice, 
manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident 
discrimination or manifest lack of reason’.234  Claimants have a very high standard of 
proof because they need to prove that a particular obligation is a state practice or opinio 
juris and that the NAFTA state has reneged from such an obligation.235 Both elements 
are not easy to prove or are, at the very least, time consuming.   
NAFTA tribunals have also acknowledged that a host state’s obligation to treat a foreign 
investor in a fair and equitable manner does not preclude the state from regulating in the 
interest of the country.236 
3.1.2. National Treatment and Most Favoured nation treatment 
NAFTA also provides for national treatment and the most favoured nation treatment. 
The national treatment is restricted to equality of treatment between domestic and 
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foreign investors within the host state’s borders237 whereas most favoured nation 
treatment prescribes treatment no less favourable than that accorded to investors 
generally meaning investors from NAFTA and non NAFTA countries.238  NAFTA 
however precludes the enforcement of these guarantees if their application results in the 
derogation from national treatment obligations related to intellectual property.239  
Both provisions introduced the notion of ‘like circumstances’ without specifying 
the context in which it is to be used. Sornarajah believes that the term is used to limit the 
effect of national treatment requirement but acknowledged the difficulty of 
understanding the nature of such a limitation in the context of investment.240 Moreover 
the concept of ‘like product’ in international trade law cannot be directly transplanted in 
international investment law.241 Questions have arisen as to whether ‘like circumstances’ 
referred to the same sector or the same line of business. Some tribunals interpreted it to 
mean the same sector242 while others viewed it as not exclusively referring to the sector 
in which a particular activity is undertaken but to the business in general.243 
The tribunal in SD Myers v Canada interpreted ‘like circumstances’ as referring to the 
‘same sector’ but warned that such interpretation should be broad enough to include 
concepts of economic sector or business sector. It further considered that: 
‘the interpretation of the phrase “like circumstances” in art 1102 must take into account 
the general principles that emerge from the legal context of the NAFTA, including both its 
concern with the environment and the need to avoid trade distortions that are not justified by 
environmental concerns. The assessment of ‘like circumstances’ must also take into account 
circumstances that would justify governmental regulations that treat them [foreign investors] 
differently in order to protect the public interest. The concept of ‘like circumstances’ invites an 
examination of whether a non-national investor complaining of less favourable treatment is in 
the same ‘sector’ as the national investor…’244 
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NAFTA tribunals have agreed that a foreign investor forfeits its right to bring a national 
treatment claim when its conduct contravened national law, notwithstanding that the 
latter was not applied uniformly.245 
3.1.3. Transfer of funds 
NAFTA parties have agreed to permit investors of another party to freely transfer funds 
and proceeds from the investment at the market rate of exchange prevailing at the time 
of the transfer.246 The right of transfer however is not absolute. NAFTA parties may 
prevent a transfer through an equitable, non-discriminatory bona fide application of their 
laws relating to bankruptcy, insolvency and protection of the right of creditors; the 
issuing, trading and dealing in securities; criminal offenses, reports of transfers of 
currency and other monetary instruments; ensuring the satisfaction of judgment in 
adjudicatory proceedings.247 The restriction is not directly related to a monetary crisis as 
formulated in BITs signed by the United Kingdom. 
3.1.4. Expropriation 
Art 1110 prohibits expropriation or nationalisation of another party investor’s 
investment unless it is for a public purpose, is done in a non-discriminatory manner, in 
accordance with due process of laws and art 1105 (1) and is subject to compensation.248 
The compensation must be equivalent to the fair market value of the investment 
immediately before the date of the expropriation.249  A non-discriminatory measure of 
general application will not amount to expropriation of a debt security covered by 
NAFTA chapter 11 simply because the investor incurs additional costs as a consequence 
and results in default on its part.250 
NAFTA provides for exceptions to the application of the guarantees granted in 
its Chapter 11 for the protection and preservation of the environment, protection of 
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human, animal and plant life or health, conservation of living and non-living exhaustible 
resources.251 
3.2. SOUTH AFRICAN PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENT BILL 
In a recent policy shift, the South African government terminated or cancelled the 
renewal of  all BITs  signed by South Africa252 and tabled the Promotion and Protection 
of Investment Bill253 in Parliament in 2013 under which all investments in South Africa 
will be regulated.254 The preamble of the Bill, on the one hand enunciates South Africa’s 
commitment to promote and protect investment while on the other hand reaffirms the 
government’s right to regulate in the public interest and to secure a balance between 
rights and obligations of investors.255 The Bill grants certain protections to investors in 
general such as compensation for loss caused by wars and other related incidents and 
some to foreign investors specifically such as national treatment. These guarantees are 
subject to the South African Constitution and the state’s sovereign right to regulate in 
the public interest.256  
3.2.1. National Treatment 
The Bill guarantees national treatment to foreign investors and their investments in like 
circumstances.257 It does not explicitly explain what it understands by ‘like 
circumstances’ but nevertheless enumerates a number of factors to be considered when 
determining whether a foreign investment is in ‘like circumstances’ as a domestic 
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investment.258 The decision maker must consider these factors collectively and not be 
influenced or biased by just one factor.259These factors are: the effect of the foreign 
investment on the republic including cumulative effects of all investments; the sector the 
foreign investment is in; the aim of any measure relating to foreign investment; and 
other factors relating to the foreign investor or the foreign investment in relation to the 
measure concerned. 
3.2.2. Security 
South Africa undertakes to accord foreign investors and their investments and returns 
equal level of security as may be generally provided to other investors and subject to 
available resources and capacity.260 Attaching the level of security of investments to the 
country’s available resources and capacity limits the liability of the state.261  
Investors are also guaranteed equal treatment and redress in respect of 
compensation without any discrimination and subject to applicable domestic laws, 
international law and customary international law262 if they suffered loss or damage as a 
result of war, armed conflicts, insurrections or riots, revolution and state of 
emergency.263 S7 therefore protects investors not only against wars and other related 
events but also against actions taken by the government or its organs and forces.264 
3.2.3. Expropriation 
The Bill prohibits expropriation or nationalization unless done in accordance with the 
Constitution, for public interest, under due process and subject to just and equitable 
compensation.265 The compensation should not only be just and equitable but should 
also reflect an equitable balance between public interest and the interest of those 
affected. In addition some factors such as the current use of the investment; the history 
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of acquisition and use of the investment; the market value of the investment and the 
purpose of the expropriation must be taken into consideration when calculating the 
amount of compensation.266The amount obtained under these conditions will be deemed 
as the value of the investment immediately before the expropriation or before it became 
known to the public.267 In this Bill South Africa thus moves away from the ‘full market 
value’ concept hence alleviating the liability of the state in respect of the amount of 
compensation. 
3.2.4. Transfer of funds 
Investors are allowed to transfer funds but subject to taxation and other applicable South 
African laws. The right of transfer is therefore not absolute.268 In other words the right of 
transfer is subject to any limitations and exceptions contained in South African 
legislation. Moreover the Bill empowers the government to take measures necessary for 
the protection of essential security interests especially in respect of the Republic’s 
financial stability.269 Transfer of funds can therefore be restricted if it jeopardises the 
economic stability of the country. 
3.2.5. Dispute resolution 
Under the Investment Bill aggrieved foreign investors can bring a claim not before an 
international arbitral tribunal, as is the practice in the area of international investment 
law. Instead disputes are resolved by an appointed mediator or other competent body.270 
Parties also have the alternative to bring a claim before any court, competent and 
independent tribunal or statutory body.271 Commentators have criticised the dispute 
resolution mechanism under the Bill as depriving foreign investors of the opportunity to 
submit disputes to a neutral international arbitral tribunal.272  The South African 
government cannot be subjected to international arbitration because it did not consent to 
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it. Moreover the arbitration process under the Bill is regulated by the South African 
Arbitration Act273 which is an out dated law and perhaps not appropriate to support 
disputes as complex as investment disputes. 
3.2.6. Criticisms of the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 
The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill has been criticised in respect of 
the level of protection granted to foreign investors. Some authors are of the opinion that 
it diminishes the rights of foreign investors since it does not provide for the ‘just and 
equitable treatment’, ‘full protection and security’ standards and ‘most favoured nation 
treatment’ found in BITs.274 
  All rights and guarantees given under the Bill are subject to the Constitution and 
the state’s regulatory power.275 Indeed the interpretation of the investor’s rights is 
subject to the Constitution and international law. The latter will only be considered as 
long as it does not contravene the Constitution.276 Commentators argue that the 
interpretation clause is contradictory as it seeks on the one hand to restrict the 
application of customary international law to its consistency with the Constitution while 
on the other hand including international agreements relevant to investments which are 
normally interpreted in line with customary international law.277  
The Bill has further narrowed investor’s rights in respect of compensation in the 
event of expropriation by providing for ‘just and equitable’ compensation instead of the 
‘full market value of the investment’ usually adopted in BITs.278 Expropriation is 
allowed as long as it is consistent with the Constitution. One of the reasons given for 
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reverting to a national investment regime is that the protection in the South African 
Constitution against arbitrary expropriation is amply sufficient.279 
Subjecting the investment regime to national legislation makes it susceptible to 
unilateral changes by the government and legislative bodies hence creating uncertainties 
and insecurities.280 The investor is no longer assured of a stable investment regime.281 
The South African Institute of International Affairs is of the opinion that the Bill 
strongly emphasises on the regulatory powers of the state in the public interest thus 
giving the government too much discretion and endangering the consistency and the 
stability of the economic framework.282 
3.2.7. Lessons for OHADA 
NAFTA linked ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ standards 
to the customary international minimum standard and clarified that those two concepts 
do not require treatment in addition to or beyond customary international standard of 
treatment of aliens.283 That being said it did not prevent arbitral tribunal from adopting 
different interpretations regarding the liability threshold under customary international 
law. UNCTAD identified three different interpretations of the standards284 namely: 
 The minimum standard of treatment equated to the Neer formula which has a 
very high liability threshold. Host states will only be liable for very serious 
breaches.285 
  The minimum standard of treatment that goes beyond the Neer formula. The 
liability threshold is not as high as the one linked to the Neer standard; finally  
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 The arbitral tribunal in Merril v Canada does not see any difference between the 
obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment and that of according the 
minimum standard of treatment if the former is interpreted literally. Therefore 
despite the Notes of Interpretation issued by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
there are still controversies as to the right application and interpretation of these 
standards.  
The very foundation of OHADA is legal and judicial security which goes to 
suggest that neither unqualified standards of protection nor standards linked to 
customary international law help achieve that objective. Indeed the former are too pro 
investor considering that the liability threshold is low and the host state obligations too 
broad while the latter are too taxing on claimants and cannot encourage investors to 
bring in their capital because the liability threshold is too high. 
UNCTAD has suggested a number of formulations of the fair and equitable 
treatment, advising that the best alternative for African countries and in this case 
OHADA countries would be to clarify or qualify the standards of protection thus 
replacing a broad provisions such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’ or ‘full protection and 
security’ with specific obligations.286 It did however suggest that countries could 
altogether omit the ‘fair and equitable’ and ‘full protection and security’ standards due to 
the ambiguity of their interpretation. South Africa has adopted this approach. 
The same rationale applies to the ‘full protection and security’ clause. Mahnaz 
was of the opinion that using the classical formulation of full protection and security 
without qualifying it will be too taxing on host states as they will not only have to ensure 
the physical protection of investments but also the legal and economic protection which 
will have the effect of limiting the sovereign power of the state to regulate in the public 
interest.287  
South Africa tied the protection of investments to the country’s available 
resources. This formulation is advantageous to the state since its liability is proportionate 
to its ability to perform its obligation. However it might discourage foreign investors 
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since it is not guaranteed that its investment is safe. Arbitral tribunals have pointed out 
that it would be unreasonable for an investor to expect its investment to never suffer any 
damage. OHADA countries should therefore consider either clarifying the standard’s 
scope or limiting its application to certain aspects of the agreement or not including at 
all. 
However the limitation of the right to transfer provided both in NAFTA and the South 
African Bill should be adopted by OHADA countries. Granting absolute rights of 
transfer will put the host state in a very precarious situation in the event of a financial 
crisis.  
An MFN clause is inherently very broad and can allow investors to use 
substantive rights granted under different BITs. OHADA formulation of the MFN clause 
should narrow it down by prohibiting its application to substantive rights in BITs signed 
with third parties or specify the context in which the clause is to be applied.  
Lastly OHADA countries should ensure that they provide for regulatory space in 
the interest of the country but not overly emphasise on it the way South Africa has done 
in its draft Bill. Insisting too much on such discretion would scare away foreign 
investors as they will be vulnerable to changes in the legal regime at the pleasure of the 
state. Alternatively they could provide for exceptions similar to art XX of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The preamble to BITs should also strike a 
balance between the state’s right to regulate and foreign investors’ rights of 
protection.288 
3.3. CONCLUSION 
Investment protection is a double edged sword. African countries are torn between 
preserving the country’s national interest and attracting much needed investment. On the 
one hand, Pro investor BIT drafting will put host countries in a precarious position and 
will make them susceptible to arbitration for actions taken by the government for 
legitimate reasons. On the other hand, stringent measures in favour of the state would 
bring about legal uncertainty and discourage investors. 
                                                          




Arbitral tribunals have agreed however that while states have obligations towards 
investors they cannot jeopardise the country’s policies in favour of investments. More 
specific provisions would be beneficial to both parties. However there is no guarantee 
that arbitral tribunals will follow a specific interpretation as they are not bound by a 
common law system of precedent. If anything interpretations by arbitral tribunals are 
unpredictable as the example of NAFTA showed.  It is up to an arbitrator to decide 
whether it will inform its decisions from previous awards. Hence drafting an investment 
agreement with more specific provisions does not absolutely guarantee that clauses of 
the agreement will be interpreted uniformly but it certainly maximises the chances of 
reaching the desired outcome.     
I have examined whether NAFTA chapter on investment and the South African 
model would be a viable models in the event OHADA harmonises the investment laws 
of its member states. I now turn to the OHADA arbitration system to determine whether 
















CHAPTER FOUR: OHADA ARBITRATION AND INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES 
4. INTRODUCTION 
The OHADA system is entirely founded on the concept of ‘legal and judicial security’. 
This entails on the one hand providing harmonised, simple, modern and adaptable 
business laws while ensuring the conscientious application of these laws through an 
effective judicial system on the other hand.289 For that purpose Uniform Acts290 were 
enacted and the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA)291 created to ensure 
their proper and consistent application.292 Consequently the CCJA has powers to review 
in cassation decisions made by courts of Appeal of OHADA states.293 The court also 
acts as a Centre of arbitration.294  
Arbitration has become the preferred mode of dispute resolution for foreign 
economic operators for several reasons the most cited being that it is less time 
consuming, cheaper, confidential, neutral and more importantly parties have control over 
the arbitration process.295 In other words parties to an arbitration agreement have the 
autonomy to choose the forum and the arbitrators. Cuperlier argued that international 
commercial operators would prefer arbitration to national courts ‘to avoid being 
confronted with a national justice system which they fear, rightly or wrongly, will favour 
its nationals, disregard the principles of international trade; or can only be source of 
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slowness and negative publicity; such fear is accentuated when dealing with public 
entities’.296 Most importantly, foreign arbitral awards can be enforce with ease across 
borders more effectively than foreign court judgment, through enforcement conventions 
such as the New York Convention.297 
Several international arbitration conventions and arbitration rules  have been designed to 
regulate arbitration and its incidental matters such as the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment disputes between states and national of other states298 , the New York 
Convention299 and the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules (ICC 
Rules)300, to cite a few.  
All CEMAC states’ investment charters invariably include OHADA arbitration 
to settle contentions arising out of their provisions. The same cannot be said in the case 
of BITs which generally refer to international arbitration systems such as the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), United Nations 
Commission on International Trade law (UNCITRAL) and International Chamber of 
Commerce arbitration among others with ICSID being the most frequently used. The 
question then remains whether the OHADA arbitration system is effective enough to 
settle investor-states arbitration like ICSID arbitration in the event that OHADA 
harmonises investment laws, bearing in mind that ICSID arbitration system has the 
advantage of experience in these matters. 
4.1. OHADA ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
The perceived advantages of arbitration by foreign investors have raised the status of 
arbitration to being the mode of dispute settlement of choice in the OHADA region. 
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CEMAC states have included it not only in their national investment laws301 but also in 
BITs to assure investors of a neutral forum in which they can assert their rights. In line 
with this idea CEMAC countries have therefore expressed their intention to encourage 
recourse to arbitration and guarantee the enforcement of arbitral awards.302 
OHADA provides for two types of arbitration namely ad hoc arbitration under 
the Uniform Act on Arbitration (UAA)303 and institutional arbitration under the aegis of 
the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration.304 This chapter will look at each type of 
OHADA arbitration especially the provisions on recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards and determine the strengths and weaknesses of the OHADA system of 
arbitration vis-à-vis foreign investors. 
4.1.1. Arbitration under the Uniform Act on Arbitration  
OHADA Uniform Acts are directly applicable and overriding in the OHADA member 
state notwithstanding conflicting national laws, either previous or subsequent.305 
Consequently Uniform Acts take precedence over national laws in respect of matters 
governed by them. They do not repeal national legislation but merely render ineffective 
those provisions that are contrary to them.306 Thus the Uniform Act on Arbitration is the 
law governing arbitration in the OHADA member states.307 
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As mentioned above arbitration under the UAA308 is ad hoc. Therefore it does 
not benefit from administrative support by an arbitration centre and all questions 
surrounding the arbitration are handled by the parties, the arbitrators and national courts.  
Parties to arbitration proceedings have the autonomy to choose the forum of arbitration, 
the applicable law and the arbitrators. Moreover ad hoc arbitration has the additional 
advantage of flexibility as parties can derogate from non-mandatory arbitration rules if 
they wish to do so.309  
UAA arbitration will only be resorted to when the seat of the arbitral tribunal is 
in one of the OHADA member states310 and in respect of rights of which a party has free 
disposal.311 Rights that can be freely disposed of are rights which parties can freely 
enjoy and enforce in a forum other than national courts.312 Therefore they do not require 
the involvement of public authorities.313 Investment disputes can therefore be settled by 
UAA arbitration provided the seat of the arbitral tribunal is in an OHADA state.314 
Moreover the UAA allows states and other public entities to participate in 
arbitration proceedings without the possibility of invoking national law to contest the 
arbitrability of the claim, their capacity to sign arbitration agreements or the validity of 
the arbitration agreement.315 Therefore when an OHADA state signs an arbitration 
agreement it waives its immunity from jurisdiction. 
4.1.1.1. Arbitral awards 
 Arbitral awards once issued have a res judicata effect.316 They are not subject to 
appeals on the merits but can nevertheless be annulled on application by one of the 
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parties.317 The petition for annulment is heard by the competent national court of the 
member state where the seat of arbitration is located318 and has the effect of suspending 
recognition and enforcement of the award until the matter is settled.319 The petitioning 
party should lodge the petition as soon as the award is made or within one month of 
notification of the award320 and must prove one of the following grounds: 
 The arbitral tribunal has ruled without an arbitration agreement or based on an 
agreement which is void or has expired; 
 The arbitral tribunal was irregularly constituted or the sole arbitrator was 
irregularly appointed; 
 The arbitral tribunal has exceeded its mandate; 
 The principle of audi alteram partem321 or adversary procedure has not been 
observed; 
 The tribunal violated an international public policy rule of the states signatories 
to the OHADA Treaty; 
 If no reasons are given for the award. 322 
The judge hearing the petition however does not review the award on its merit. He is 
only allowed to do so to the extent necessary to determine a violation of public policy. 
He/she is therefore not allowed to issue a new judgment but can either reject the 
application or declare the award null and void.323 The annulment order can be set aside 
by the CCJA324 but in the event it is upheld, parties can initiate fresh arbitration 
proceedings. It has been argued that the annulment process may have a dissuading effect 
on foreign investors as it gives a malicious party an opportunity to use the arbitration 
system to frustrate or delay enforcement of an arbitral award.325 However one should 
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also consider that such a mechanism, on the one hand, protects parties against fraud and 
on the other hand protects the state’s right of oversight of arbitrations carried out within 
its borders. 
4.1.1.2. Enforcement and recognition under the Uniform Act of Arbitration 
Enforcement and execution of awards are the most important aspects of arbitration 
because they give the arbitration process meaning. Douajini argued that ‘the 
effectiveness of arbitration transpires through the ease with which arbitral awards can be 
executed’.326 Meuke and Konate found execution of arbitral awards to be a natural 
consequence of an effective arbitration and noted that: 
‘The arbitral award must be executed for the party that benefits from it to concretely obtain 
what it is entitled to expect’327 
Epie similarly observed that ‘the soundness of the view that arbitration is a viable 
alternative to court proceedings can only be judged by the legal arsenal available to the 
victorious party to enforce the arbitral award’328 He considers enforcement of awards to 
be the fulcrum, the quintessence of international arbitration.329 Epie further pointed out 
that ‘it would make no sense to resort to arbitration if an award is not worth the paper on 
which it is written’.330 
When a court recognises a foreign judgement, it ‘domesticates’ it thus giving it 
the same status and authority as a national judgement. Zeynalova noted that ‘a 
recognised judgement is considered res judicata upon other actions in the recognizing 
jurisdiction because it is seen as producing the same effect and having the same 
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authority as a case originally decided in the jurisdiction’331 Though recognition was 
analysed in the context of foreign judgments the meaning and effect of recognition 
remain the same as far as arbitral awards are concerned.  
Enforcement on the other hand can be understood as ‘the act or process of 
compelling compliance with a law, a mandate or a command- in this case an arbitral 
award’332. In other words the help of the courts of the enforcing jurisdiction is required 
to execute the recognised judgment or award.333 
An arbitral award under the UAA can only be enforceable after an exequatur has 
been granted by the national court of the member state where enforcement is 
sought.334An exequatur is not in itself an enforceable act but makes the arbitral award 
binding and therefore enforceable.335 It is a pre requisite to execution of an arbitral 
award.336 It therefore should be understood as a ‘leave to enforce an award’.337  
The exequatur will only be granted by the competent court upon proof of 
existence of the award and if it is not contrary to the international public policy of 
member states.338 Existence of the arbitral award is established by the presentation of the 
award together with the arbitration agreement or certified copies thereof. Therefore the 
national judge does not examine the award on its merit but simply verifies the 
authenticity of the documents presented.339  
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The exequatur can however be denied if contrary to the international public 
policy of the member states.340 Several authors have argued that international public 
policy of member states refers to the public policy of the Community.341 The CCJA 
however has not yet issued guidelines as to what constitutes a breach of the community 
public policy and the courts of member states which were confronted with the issue 
referred to their national public policy.342 Until the CCJA interprets the provision the 
uncertainty of such a provision and the reliance on national law by default does not 
reassure the foreign investor that states will not misuse the public policy defence to deny 
enforcement of an award.  
Moreover the fact that the exequatur under the UAA is state specific will not 
encourage foreign parties to resort to OHADA arbitration under the UAA in comparison 
to the community exequatur of the CCJA.343 A foreign investor will have to go through 
the process of enforcement and recognition all over again if it decides to have the 
judgement enforced in another member state. This is the practice in all commercial 
arbitrations and is not necessarily a problem.  
An interesting feature of UAA is found in art 34 which recognises as binding in 
OHADA member states arbitral awards made on the basis of different rules and 
conventions to which OHADA states are members, subject to conditions spelled out in 
an international agreement. The UAA in that case will only be applied to fill gaps.344 
Thus the UAA coexists and complements the New York Convention and ICSID 
Convention in the OHADA space.345 A problem might arise when an award has to be 
enforced in a state not member to these international agreements. The foreign investor is 
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nevertheless not left without any avenue as he can rely on the UAA in the alternative. 
However Cuperlier was of the opinion that: 
‘…Its [UAA] multiple references to the competent judge in the member state has 
confined the application of the Uniform Act to local arbitration and do not allow it to 
answer in its own capacity to the concerns of international investors’346 
4.1.2. Arbitration under the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration 
Institutional arbitration in OHADA is conducted under the auspice of the CCJA.347  The 
CCJA does not act as an arbitral tribunal but offers administrative support to the 
arbitration.348 CCJA arbitration is only possible if there is a link between OHADA 
member states and the matter in dispute or the parties. Thus parties to a contract can only 
use CCJA arbitration if one of the parties has its domicile or its habitual residence in a 
member state or if the contract in respect of which there is a dispute was to be performed 
wholly or partially in one or more OHADA states.349 The dispute however has to be of a 
contractual nature.  
Art 21 excludes investment disputes within its scope. Investment disputes under 
investment treaties differ from contractual disputes as they arise out of a BIT signed 
between the host state and the investor’s home state. Investors are not direct parties to 
such a treaty but benefit from its provisions.  It has been argued that contractual claims 
differ from claims under BITs in respect of their legal source, the content of the rights 
and the parties to the dispute.350 Investment disputes may also arise out of investment 
contracts (eg long term concessions) concluded between an investor and a state.   
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4.1.2.1. Arbitral awards 
Limiting the scope of CCJA arbitration to disputes of a contractual nature is unfortunate 
since it is the better system in comparison to UAA arbitration.351 For instance, in 
addition to the res judicata effect of an award352, an exequatur delivered by the CCJA 
has authority in the whole of the region rather than just in the country where an 
exequatur petition is lodged.353 This compares favourably to the ICSID and the New 
York Convention systems. 
Under ICSID parties are under an obligation to recognise an award rendered 
pursuant to the convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by 
that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that state.354 
The winning party in ICSID arbitration does not need an exequatur but merely has to 
present a certified copy of the award to the designated court or authority for the award to 
be recognized.355 The recognition is however country specific.  
Similarly the New York Convention conditions recognition and enforcement of 
an award upon presentation of a duly authenticated arbitral award together with the 
arbitration agreement to the competent court of the recognising state and is only 
applicable in that state.356  
The CCJA system does, however, have its weaknesses. Art 25 of the OHADA 
Treaty does not include improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal as one of the 
exceptions to the grant of an exequatur. Moreover the CCJA Arbitration rules provide 
that an exequatur may be denied if the arbitrator ruled without any arbitration agreement 
or based on a void arbitration agreement; if the arbitrator exceeded its mandate; when 
the principle of adversary procedure was not respected; and if the award is contrary to 
public policy.357 Some authors pointed out that: 
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 ‘the absence of a provision allowing the parties to contest the validity of an award if the 
tribunal has been improperly constituted is more troubling because it presupposes the 
infallibility of the CCJA in such matters which may not always be the case’.358  
4.1.2.2. Enforcement and recognition under the CCJA arbitration rules 
Despite the fact that recognition of arbitral awards has been made easier in 
OHADA member states through the community exequatur, execution remains 
problematic. The Uniform Act on Simplified Recovery Procedures and Measures of 
Execution (AUPSRVE) prohibits forced execution and conservatory measures on 
persons benefiting from immunity from execution and offers compensation in the 
alternative provided the debt is certain and liquidated.359 In other words consent to 
arbitration in OHADA amounts to a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction360 but not of 
immunity from execution.  
The CCJA supported this position in its judgment of 7th July 2005 in which it 
held that Togo Telcom, a Togolese public company liable to pay its employees certain 
sums of money, was covered by immunity from execution as provided for in art 30 of 
the AUPSRVE and consequently quashed the judgement issued by the Lomé court of 
Appeal.361 Commentators observed that the CCJA interpretation of art 30 is contrary to 
the OHADA objective of legal and judicial security.362  
The ICSID encounters the same difficulties when issues of execution arise. Art 
55 of the ICSID Convention provides that nothing in art 54 shall be construed as 
derogating from the law in force in any contracting state relating to immunity of that 
state or of any foreign state from execution. Therefore execution of an ICSID award is 
subject to the laws on execution of the state in which execution is sought.363 
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Some jurisdictions like France have acknowledged that consent to arbitration 
waives both immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution.364 The ICC 
equally specifies in its arbitration rules that: 
‘…By submitting the dispute to arbitration under the Rules, the parties undertake to carry out 
any award without delay and shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse 
insofar as such waiver can validly be made.’365 
4.2. CONCLUSION 
OHADA has created an arbitration system of international standard. Arbitration under 
the UAA may, however, be less attractive to investors because of the constant referral to 
national jurisdiction when compared to CCJA arbitration. Yet national court 
involvement is important as a check and balance mechanism to protect the interest of the 
state.   
The UAA also acknowledges the existence of other international arbitration 
systems and ensures the enforcement of arbitral awards from such arbitration. Therefore 
a foreign investor with an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention or a commercial 
or investment award rendered outside the OHADA space will be enforceable under the 
ICSID or the New York Convention provided the member state is also a party to these 
international conventions. Where the member state in which recognition and 
enforcement is sought is not party to any of these conventions the foreign investor can 
rely on the UAA in the alternative. The fact that the exequatur is only applicable in the 
recognising state can be less appealing when one considers the CCJA arbitration which 
offers a simplified and more effective recognition system.  
One of the more significant innovations of OHADA arbitration is the community 
exequatur which makes an award enforceable in all OHADA states once it has been 
issued by the CCJA. This mechanism however is only available when the dispute to be 
settled by arbitration is of a contractual nature. Investment disputes arising out of a BIT 
do not benefit from the community exequatur because such disputes are not resolved 
through CCJA arbitration. ICSID (or investor-state arbitration administered under 
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another set of rules such as the UNCITRAL rules) is therefore the only available 
alternative to parties.  
Execution of arbitral awards is the Achilles’ heel of OHADA arbitration system. 
The fact that the CCJA chose to interpret art 30 of the AUPSRVE in a restrictive manner 
renders the community exequatur ineffective and defeats the ‘legal and judicial security’ 
objective of the OHADA Treaty. One of the consequences of the objective would be to 
have an effective system of enforcement of decisions. Thus OHADA should adopt 
France’s approach of assuming that consent to arbitration waives both immunity from 
execution and immunity from jurisdiction and put restrictions on the type of property 
against which execution may be levied.366 
I have analysed the OHADA arbitration system in order to determine whether or 
not it would effectively settle investment disputes and now I turn to the last chapter 
which will consist of the conclusions drawn from the analysis carried out from chapter 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation was to assess whether investment laws could be 
harmonised in OHADA space and if so what would be the appropriate protection to 
grant foreign investors. Moreover we had to determine whether or not OHADA has the 
proper mechanisms to resolve investment disputes should they arise. 
5.1  CONCLUSIONS 
 The process of harmonisation and modernisation of business laws in OHADA space 
was initiated to achieve legal and judicial security and at the same time encourage 
investments in the region. Legal and judicial insecurity was identified as the main cause 
of the drop of investments in the region.367 Hence the concept of legal and judicial 
security was adopted not only in national investment laws of certain OHADA countries 
but also in sub regional investment codes such as the CEMAC investment charter.368  
Some researchers however have argued that legal stability of a country does not 
really influence an investor’s decision to invest369, others have argued that it is one of 
several factors an investor will consider when making its decision370 while others 
pointed out that no significant increase of investment was registered despite the legal 
changes done by developing countries.371 The majority of researches reviewed show that 
legal stability may be one of the factors investors will consider but not the most 
compelling one. Moreover it is difficult to prove that there would be less investment in 
the absence of legal reforms. 
OHADA countries all have national investment codes. Six of the seventeen 
OHADA states have the CEMAC investment charter to which their national codes must 
conform. Moreover the UEMOA, which shares members with OHADA, also has an 
investment code that was not analysed due to lack of accessible information. The 
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harmonisation of investment laws by OHADA would therefore be repetitive if not 
problematic because there would be several investment codes running simultaneously in 
the region. The relationship between CEMAC and OHADA has not yet been clarified 
but decisions of the CEMAC court of Justice and that of UEMOA suggest that these 
courts are willing to recognise the supremacy of OHADA law and their lack of 
competence to hear matters regulated by OHADA Uniform Acts.372 In addition to that 
CEMAC States, through the Investment Charter, reiterated their adherence to the 
OHADA Treaty; undertook to abide by the procedures and decisions of the CCJA and to 
adapt their national laws to OHADA judicial framework and rules.373 Hence despite the 
vague relationship between OHADA and CEMAC law, case law and investment laws in 
the region suggest that if OHADA decides to include investment law within its ambit the 
Uniform Act on investment will supersede all existing investment laws in the region.  
National and sub-regional investment codes are not the only instruments 
governing investment within the region. OHADA states also sign BITs with capital 
exporting States for the purpose of protecting investments. The classical standards of 
protection are fair and equitable treatment; full protection and security; most favoured 
nation treatment; national treatment; free transfer of funds and prohibition of 
expropriation. The majority of BITs analysed were signed and not enforced but they 
provided an idea of the type of protections OHADA countries are willing to concede. 
Generally CEMAC countries offer protections without qualifying them which implies 
that the liability threshold is quite low making them liable to investors in broad 
circumstances.374 Some arbitral tribunals have tried to qualify such obligations by 
arguing that BITs are not insurance policies but that is not the trend.375  
NAFTA included a chapter on investment and seem to have a precise and 
predictable set of laws with clear interpretation rules. Indeed the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission has issued Notes of Interpretation of certain chapter 11 provisions to guide 
arbitral tribunals in their interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security standards. The Notes however did not prevent differing 
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interpretations from being adopted by NAFTA arbitral tribunals.376 The interpretation of 
standards of protection in BITs is unpredictable due to the lack of clear definition of the 
content of these standards.377 Moreover the ad hoc nature of arbitral tribunal makes 
consistency of decisions impossible because tribunals are not bound by a system of 
precedent.378  The South African model may not be the best example to follow because it 
emphasises more on the state’s regulatory space than on investment protection leaving 
foreign investors vulnerable to unilateral changes by governments.  
OHADA provides for both ad hoc and institutional arbitration.  The question that 
begged to be answered was whether OHADA had the proper mechanisms to resolve 
investment disputes effectively.  The ad hoc arbitration under UAA is suitable to 
commercial and not investment disputes. It nevertheless has the advantage of 
recognising arbitral awards outside OHADA. Arbitration under the CCJA would have 
been the best avenue to foreign investors379 but is not available to them because 
investment disputes are not resolved under the CCJA. Parties to an investment disputes 
arising out of a BIT who choose OHADA arbitration can only resort to ad hoc 
arbitration which does not have an appealing enforcement mechanism to foreign 
investors. In the current situation, therefore, international systems such as the ICSID 
arbitration remain the best option despite all criticisms levelled against it.380  
Execution of arbitral awards remains problematic within the region. Judicial 
security, one of the fundamental objectives of OHADA, entails on the one hand proper 
application of the law and on the other hand, effective enforcement mechanisms.  
Allowing states to rely on immunity from execution is contrary to that objective.381 
Since the OHADA Treaty and the CCJA rules on arbitration stop member states from 
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interfering with the recognition of arbitral awards, they should also eliminate any 
opportunity for States to avoid execution of awards.  
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analysis conducted from chapter one to four I will make a number of 
recommendations. 
My first recommendation is that the investment codes in CEMAC and UEMOA 
be synced in an OHADA Uniform Act. Multiplicity of laws is a source of judicial and 
legal uncertainty. Creating one investment law in the region would have the double 
benefit of enhancing legal security and reassuring foreign investors 
My second recommendation is that it will be in the interest of OHADA countries 
when signing BITs to make sure that the standards of protection are specific enough to 
curb arbitral tribunals’ broad interpretation. Santiago Montt, on his part, suggested that if 
arbitral tribunals persist in adopting a pro investor stance to their interpretation, 
developing states should abandon the BITs scheme altogether.382 
My third recommendation regarding CJJA arbitration is that the OHADA Treaty 
can expand the scope of institutional arbitration and adopt the language in art 7 of the 
UNCITRAL Model law on arbitration which  subjects to arbitration disputes in respect 
of defined legal relationships whether contractual or not. 
Lastly on the issue of execution I recommend that the Council of Ministers 
rephrases the provision of the Uniform Act on execution in such terms as to prevent 
states from avoiding execution. It can therefore adopt the language of art 34 (6) of the 
ICC Arbitration Rules and France’s approach in respect of the question of property 
against which execution can be levied. 
   
 
                                                          
382






AES v Hungary ICSID Case No ARB/02/17, award 23 September 2010 
American Manufacturing and Trading (AMT) Inc v Zaire (ICSID case No Arb/93/1 
award 21 February 1997 
Asian Agricultural Product Ltd v Republic of Sri Lanka ICSID Case No ARB/87/3 
Azurix v Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/01/12 award of 14th July 2006 
Bayindir v Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/03/29, award of 27 August 2005 
CME Czech Republic BV (the Netherlands) v Czech Republic UNCITRAL Rules, partial 
award 13 September 2001 
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/01/8, award 12 May 2005 
Cour Constitutionelle du Sénégal, arrêt No 3/C/93 du 16 Décembre 1993 
Cour de Justice de la CEMAC, Chambre Judiciaire, Arrêt No 003/CJ/CEMAC/CJ/03 du 
03/07/2003. Affaire Tasha Loweh Lawrence contre Decision COBAC D-2000/22 et 
Amity Bank Cameroon PLC (recourse n annulation de la decision COBAC D-2000/22 
Duke Energy v Ecuador, ICSID case No ARB/04/19 award 18 August 2008 
EDF v Romania, ICSID case No ARB/05/13, award of 8 October 2009 
L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States (1926) 60 
LG&E v Argentina, ICSID case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006 
Noble Ventures v Romania ICSID case No ARB/01/11, award of 12 October 2005 
Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v Ecuador, London Court of International 
Arbitration case No UN 3467, Final award 1 July 2004 
Pantechniki v Albania ICSID Case No ARB/07/21, award of 30 July 2009 
Parkerings- Compagniet v Lithuania, ICSID case No ARB/05/8 award 11 September 
2007 
Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada, UNCITRAL Final Merits Award of 10 April 2001 
PSGE Global et al v Republic of Turkey, ICSID case No ARB/02/5 19 January 2007 
Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. & Allan Fosk Kaplún v Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/06/2 
Romak S.A. (Switzerland) v the Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No AA28 
Salini Construttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A v Kingdom of Morocco (2001), ICSID 
case No ARB/00/4 




Siemens AG v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007 




Arbitration Rules of the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration 
Loi No 006/PR/2008 du 3 Janvier 2008 (Chad Investment Charter) 
Loi No 01-010 du 16 Juillet 2001(Central African Republic Investment Charter) 
Loi No 15- 1998 instituant la Charte des investissements du Gabon 
Loi No 2002-004 du 19 Avril 2002 modifiee par la Loi No 2004-20 du 22 juillet 2004 et 
par l’Ordonnance No 2009-001 du 13 Mai 2009 (Cameroun Investment Charter) 
Loi No 6-2003 du 18 Janvier 2003 (Republic of Congo Investment Charter) 
Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, Notice 1087 of 2013, Department of Trade 
and Industry, Staatskoeran, 1st November 2013, No 36995 
Regional Instruments 
Arbitration Rules of the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration 
Reglèment No 17/99/CEMAC-20-CM-03 du 17 Décembre 1999 or CEMAC Investment 
Charter 
Treaty on the Economic Community of the Central African States, 1994 revised in 2008 
Treaty on the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa adopted at 
Port Louis on 17th October 1993 
Treaty on the West African Economic and Monetary Union, 1994 
Uniform Act on Arbitration adopted on 11 March 1999 
Uniform Act on simplified recovery procedures and measures of execution adopted on 
10 April 1998 
International Conventions and Treaties 
Cameroon-Egypt BIT signed on 24 October 2000 not in force 
Cameroon-United Kingdom BIT in force 1985 
Central African Republic- Egypt signed on 7 February 2000 not in force 
Central African Republic-Germany BIT (1965) signed not in force 
Central African Republic-Morocco signed on 26 September 2006 not in force 
Central African Republic-Switzerland BIT in force since 1973 
Chad-Germany BIT in force since 1968 
75 
 
Chad-Guinea BIT (2004) signed but not in force 
Chad-Lebanon BIT signed on 15 June 2004 not in force 
Congo- United States BIT in force since 1994 
Congo-China BIT signed on 20 March 2000 not in force 
Congo-Germany BIT signed on 22 November 2010 not in force 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 
Convention on the settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
other States, 1965 
Equatorial Guinea- Morocco BIT signed in 5 July 2005 not in force 
Equatorial Guinea-France in force 1983 
Gabon-Morocco BIT 2004 in force on 24 July 2009 
Gabon-Turkey BIT 2012 signed on 18 July 2012 but not in force 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration 2012 
United Nations Convention on jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 
New York, 2nd December 2004 
Secondary Sources 
Books 
Andenas, Mads, Andersen, Camilla Baasch and Ashcroft, Ross ‘Towards a theory of 
harmonisation’ in Mads Andenas and Camilla Baasch Andersen (eds) Theory and 
Practice of Harmonisation (2011) Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, United 
Kingdom 
Cadiet Loïc Droit et attractivité économique: Le cas de l’OHADA (2013) IRJS éditions, 
Paris 
Dimsey, Mariel The resolution of international investment disputes: Challenges and 
solutions (2008) Eleven International Publishing, Netherlands 
Dolzer, Rudolf and Schreuer, Christopher Principles of international investment law 
(2008) Oxford University Press, New York 
JM Tchakoua ‘L’arbitrabilité des différends dans l’espace OHADA’ in A Feneon les 
grands articles de doctrine de l’OHADA (2013) editions Juris Africa  
Kläger, Roland ‘Fair and equitable treatment’ in international investment law (2011) 
Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 
Leboulanger, Philippe and Douajini,Kenfack Gaston ‘Arbitration under the Common 
Court of Justice and Arbitration of the OHADA contracting states’ in Bosman, Lise (ed) 




Martor, Boris; Pilkington, Nanette; Seller, David S et al Business law in Africa: OHADA 
and the Harmonization process 2ed (2007) GMB Publishing Ltd, United Kingdom 
Mohammed, Baba Idris ‘Harmonisation of business laws in Africa_ An insight into 
laws, issues, problems and Prospects’ in Claire Moore Dickerson (ed) Unified Business  
laws for Africa: Common law perspectives on OHADA, 2ed (2012), IEDP, London 
Montt, Santiago State liability in investment treaty arbitration (2009) Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon 
Sornarajah, Muthucumaraswamy The international law on foreign investment 2ed 
(2004) Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 
Sureda, Andrés Rigo Investment treaty arbitration: judging under uncertainty (2012) 
Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 
 
Journals  
Albuquerque, Rui ‘The Composition of International Capital Flows: Risk Sharing 
through Foreign Direct Investment’ (2003) 61 Journal of International Economics 353 
Alexander, A Emily ‘Taking account of reality: Adopting contextual standards for 
developing countries in international investment law’ (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 815 
Alexander, A Emily ‘Taking account of reality: Adopting contextual standards for 
developing countries in international investment law’ (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of 
International law 815 
Asiedu, Elisabeth ‘On the Determinant of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing 
Countries: Is Africa different?’ (2001) 30 World Development 107 
Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès, Coupet, Maylis and Mayer, Thierry ‘Institutional determinants 
of Foreign Direct Investment (2007) The World Economy 764 
Biswas, Romita ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments’ (2002) 6 Review of 
Development Economics 492 
Boodman, Martin ‘The myth of harmonization of laws, (1991) 39 The American Journal 
of Comparative Law 699 
Borenztein, Eduardo, De Gregorio, Jose and Lee, Jong-Wha ‘How does foreign direct 
investment affect economic growth’ (1998) 45 Journal of International Economics 115 
Chakrabarti, Avik ‘The Determinant of Foreign Investment: Sensitivity analyses of 
Cross- Country Regressions’ (2001) 54 KYKLOS 89 
De Backer, Koen and Sleuwaegen, Leo ‘Does foreign investment crowd out domestic 
entrepreneurship?’(2003) 22 Review of Industrial Organization 67 
Demirhan, Erdal and Masca, Mahmut ‘Determinants of foreign direct investment flows 




Douajini, Kenfack Gaston ‘The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in 
OHADA member states’ (2003) 20 Journal of International Arbitration 205  
Douajni, Kenfack Gaston ‘L’exécution des sentences arbitrales dans l’espace OHADA’ 
(2010) Revue Camerounaise de l’arbitrage Numéro special 
Draper, Peter & Langalanga, Azwimpheleli ‘Does the draft investment bill threaten 
foreign investors’ rights?’ (2014) South African Institute of International Affairs 
El Attar, Bassant, Li, Bo-Young, Kessler, Didier et al ‘Expropriation clauses in 
international investment agreements and the appropriate room for host State to enact 
regulations: A practical guide for States and investors’ Graduate Institute of 
International Development studies, June 2009 
Estrella Fria, José Angelo ‘Future direction of legal harmonization and law reform: 
Stormy sea or prosperous voyage’ (2009) Unif. Law. Rev, Oxford Journals 5 
Feldstein, Martin ‘Aspects of Global Economic Integration: Outlook for the Future’ 
(2000) NBER Working Paper No. 7899 
Feng Liang, Helen ‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Improve the Productivity of 
Domestic Firms? Technology Spillovers, Industry Linkages, and Firm Capabilities’ 
(2008) Haas School of Business University of California, Berkeley 
Hoffman, Anne Kristin (ed) ‘Protection of Foreign Investment through Modern Treaty 
Arbitration: Diversity and Harmonization’ (2010) ASA Special Series No 34 
Kalirajan, Kaliappa and Mottaleb, Khondoker Abdul ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment in developing countries: A comparative analysis’ (2010) 4 The Journal of 
Applied Economics 369 
Loots, Elsabé and Kabundi, Alain ‘Foreign Direct Investment to Africa: trends, 
dynamics and challenges’ (2012) 15 South African Journal of Economic and 
Management Sciences 128 
Mahnaz, Malik ‘Full protection and security standard comes of age: Yet another 
challenge for State in investment treaty arbitration’ (2011) International Institute for 
Sustainable Development 
Mortenson, Julian Davis ‘The meaning of “Investment”: ICSID Travaux and the 
Domain of International Investment Law’ (2001) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 
Neumayer, Eric & Spess, Laura ‘Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct 
investment to developing countries?’ (2005) 33 World Development 1567 
Perry, Amanda ‘An ideal legal system for attracting foreign direct investment? Some 
theory and reality’ (2000) 15 American University International Law Review 1627  
Porcelli, Stefano and Zhai, Yuanjian ‘The challenge for the Harmonization of Law’ 
(2010) 17 Transit. Stud. Rev. 430 
Samuel-Jacques Priso- Essawe ‘Les “espaces juridiques” de securisation des 
investissements en Afrique: entre droit communautaire et droit uniforme’ (2010) Revue 
LAMY Droit Civil 
78 
 
Stephan,  B Paul ‘Futility of unification and Harmonization of international commercial 
law’ (1999) Working paper No99-10 Legal Studies Working Papers Series 
Tsai ,Pan-Long ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct investment and its impact on economic 
growth’ (1994) 19 Journal of Economic Development 137 
Tumnde, Martha Simo ‘The applicability of the OHADA Treaty in Cameroun: Problems 
and Prospects’ (2002) Université de Dschang. Annales de la faculté  des science 
juridiques et politiques. Tom 6 Numéro special 
Vandevelde, J Kenneth ‘Unified theory of fair and equitable treatment’ (2010) 43 
International law and politics 43 
Walsh, P James & Yu, Jiangyan ‘Determinants of foreign direct investment: A sectoral 
and institutional approach’ IMF Working Paper No 187 
Zeynalova, Yuliya ‘The law on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements: Is it 
broken and how do we fix it?’ (2013) 31 Berkeley Journal of international law 150 
 
Reports 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ‘Fair and equitable treatment 
standard in international investment law’, OECD Working Papers on International 
Investments, September 2004, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435, 
accessed on 25 November 2014 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Transnational corporations and 
export competitiveness’ World Investment Report 2002, UNCTAD/WIR/2002 & 
Corrigendum 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development series on issues in international 
investment agreement II ‘Fair and equitable treatment: a sequel’ (2012), New York and 
Geneva 
Internet Sources 
www.Droit-Afrique.com 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu 
http://www.ohada.com/doctrine/categorie/4/arbitrage.html 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf 
http://www.ohada.com/ 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2002_en.pdf 
 
79 
 
 
  
